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Working paper

The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement

This paper shows that antitrust investigation in a market increases leniency applications in related markets. The authors used a novel application of

Publishing date
29 February 2016
Authors
Jun Zhou
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Highlights

  • The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014.
  • The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated, but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market also engaged in collusion.
  • The revision of the Commission’s leniency programme in 2002 increased the rate of pre-investigation applications. Our results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of

About the authors

  • Jun Zhou

    Jun Zhou was a Visiting Fellow from October 2015 to January 2016. Since November 2016 he is a Visiting Scholar at the Department of Economics of Bar-Ilan University.

    Jun's research interests include competition policy and regulation, particularly those in the EU. His work at Bruegel explored the potential difference in antitrust penalty determination processes between the European Commission and other competition authorities.

    Prior to joining Bruegel, Jun participated in and led a number of research projects for governments and authorities. His main areas of expertise include the use of game theoretical and econometric methods for the evaluation and support of policy decision making.

    Jun holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Tilburg University. In 2008, Jun received a Young Economist Award from the European Economic Association.

Theme
Microeconomic policies
Language
English

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