The European Central Bank is right to propose inclusion of owner-occupied housing services in the inflation indicator. But the ECB’s preferred method would involve an asset price in the consumer inflation indicator.
Testimony to the Monetary Dialogue Preparatory Meeting of the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).
In-depth analysis on the European Central Bank's revised inflation target prepared for the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).
This event will feature the presentation of “Monetary Policy in Times of Crisis – A Tale of Two Decades of the European Central Bank."
Most economic forecasts predict a return, in the medium-term, to pre-pandemic growth and inflation. Nevertheless, the European Central Bank and fiscal authorities need to be vigilant for signs of the contrary.
The real issue here is not that the ECB takes a very sizeable risk by pursuing climate objectives but rather, that it cannot afford not to. And by doing so, it helps establish just how urgent climate change is.
Negative rate cuts are not that different from ‘standard’ rate cuts. Like them, they reduce banks’ margins, but this effect does not appear to be amplified below 0%.
Emphasis will be placed on greening monetary policy and clarifying the ECB's price stability objective, but is this enough?
There is concern in Germany about rising prices, but expectations and wage data show no sign of excess pressures; German inflation should exceed 2% to support euro-area rebalancing but is unlikely to do so on sustained basis.
This paper explores the potential effects (and side effects) of negative rates in theory and examines the evidence to determine what these effects have been in practice in the euro area.
Use of Emergency Liquidity Assistance to prop up euro-area banks needs to be more transparent; available evidence suggests its use has not always been within the rules.
While EU Treaties clearly stipulate that the ECB “shall support the general objectives of the European Union”, it is not appropriate to simply stand by, wishing that the ECB will use its discretionary power to act on them. Political institutions of the EU should prioritise the secondary goals to legitimise the ECB’s action.