Working paper

The policy dilemma of the unitary patent

This paper provides new evidence about the budgetary consequences – for patent offices – of the coexistence of the forthcoming Unitary Patent (UP) wit

Publishing date
27 November 2014

This paper provides new evidence about the budgetary consequences – for patent offices – of the coexistence of the forthcoming Unitary Patent (UP) with the current European Patent (EP). Simulation results illustrate a dilemma between (1) high UP renewal fees to ensure enough financial income for all national patent offices (NPOs) and (2) low UP renewal fees to make the UP system affordable, with very few NPOs losing on financial revenues. The simulations help to understand the positions of several patent offices, and underline an alternative way to proceed with the negotiations while reducing financial risks for the whole system.

About the authors

  • Bruno van Pottelsberghe

    Bruno van Pottelsberghe joined Bruegel as a Senior Resident Fellow in November 2007. His research for Bruegel focuses on the effectiveness of several policy tools (R&D subsidies, R&D tax credits, intellectual property, public research and regulatory policies) aimed at stimulating innovation in Europe.

    He was the Chief Economist of the European Patent Office (EPO) from November 2005 to the end of 2007. Since 1999 he has been a professor at the Brussels‘ University (U.L.B.). As holder of the Solvay S.A. Chair of Innovation, he teaches courses related to the economics and management of innovation and intellectual property.

    He is also an adviser of the President and the Rector of the U.L.B. for technology transfer issues.

     

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