Since the Euromaidan protests (2013-2014), Ukraine has had two presidents and four governments. In a difficult environment of external aggression, they have initiated various reforms aimed at bringing the country closer to the European Union and boosting growth. Progress has been partial and relies on international backing, with limited domestic appetite for reform.
The modernisation of the Ukrainian economy and state continues to develop at an unsatisfactory pace due to a lack of pro-reform political consensus. The two upcoming election campaigns in 2019 (presidential and parliamentary) make the reform process even slower and additionally put its effectiveness and sustainability under risk. The international community has a limited toolkit to overcome this stalemate.
Ukraine’s late and incomplete economic reform created a class of super-wealthy oligarchs who now stand in the way of further liberalisation. The oligarchs’ oversized influence only deepens public distrust in a structurally weak political system. Nevertheless, Ukraine is making some attempts to uproot corruption and the next steps are clear.
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