The EU, China and Russia in a changing geopolitical landscape

The world is experiencing a seismic geopolitical shift, sparked in part by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The European Union, which had used economic interdependence as a strategic pillar, is now working to cut all economic and political ties with Russia. Meanwhile, China’s role as an enabler of Russian aggression against Ukraine has contributed to the deterioration of EU-China relations, which were already fragile due to the EU’s increasingly asymmetric dependence on China.

The EU long relied on Russian energy, the Chinese market and US military protection, although levels of dependence varied across EU countries. The war in Ukraine shattered the illusion that this reliance was sustainable. These dependencies could be explained at least partially by a belief that economic interdependence can force countries to avoid conflict and the conviction that trade can bring change (‘Wandel durch Handel’). This assumption has been proven wrong.

In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Europe has tried wean itself off Russian energy, whilst also building its own defence capacity. The EU response to Russian aggression against Ukraine was more united than many expected, including the adoption of 16 sanctions packages against Russia. The EU response to China’s enabling of Russian aggression, however, was much less evident, mostly hinging on the EU’s already ongoing efforts to  minimise its excessive dependency on China.

Before the invasion, many in Europe viewed the China-Russia relationship as a transactional alliance – one driven by convenience rather than deep ideological alignment. The outbreak of war has demonstrated that their partnership is more than just an economic arrangement. Since the invasion, China has supported Russia diplomatically in international fora, provided an economic lifeline by purchasing Russian oil and gas and enforced restrictions on the sale of drone components to Ukraine.

While China may not provide direct military assistance to Russia, its strategic alignment with Moscow serves its broader geopolitical goals. Beijing’s fundamental interest lies in challenging the US-led global order. Keeping Russia afloat – especially when Western sanctions threaten to cripple its war economy – ensures that Moscow remains a destabilising force against the West, diverting US and European attention from the Indo-Pacific.

For decades, the EU viewed China primarily as an economic partner. Since 2019, this perception has shifted, particularly since the invasion of Ukraine. Now, the EU describes China not just as a “partner” and “competitor”, but also as a “systemic rival”. Since the invasion of Ukraine, the concept of China as a threat to Europe is discussed among policymakers, although it is not part of the EU’s official position on China.  The perception of China as a threat results directly from some European leaders’ belief that China’s support for Russia undermines European security. Beyond Ukraine, Beijing’s trade policies and industrial overcapacity further erode the trust of the EU. This is not a sentiment shared by all European leaders however – Hungary and, more recently, Slovakia, continue to forge closer ties with China.

In response to Chinese influence on European economies, the EU has been working to decrease dependence and achieve “strategic autonomy” including by developing investment screening mechanisms.  But European policymakers face a difficult balancing act. The EU cannot afford to sever ties with China entirely, given its dependency on China for strategic goods, particularly critical raw materials. However, the war has reinforced the need for supply chain diversification, increased defence spending and a more unified European approach to foreign policy.

The Trump administration's stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine has further complicated the EU’s situation. In light of the US pause in military and intelligence support for Ukraine and doubts about US willingness to guarantee European security, the EU is seeking to build its own defence capacity. Furthermore, the US position draws attention away from China’s enabling of Russian aggression.

The EU, though, should not forget how the conflict evolved, including China’s position. Now, the challenge is clear: Europe must build a new strategy – one that acknowledges the reality of a world where economic power alone is no longer enough to ensure security and stability. It is clear that neither China nor the US will contribute to resolving this conflict in favour of Ukraine and the EU. Europe is coming to terms with this reality.

ZhōngHuá Mundus is a newsletter by Bruegel, bringing you monthly analysis of China in the world, as seen from Europe.

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ZhōngHuá Mundus is a newsletter by Bruegel, bringing you monthly analysis of China in the world, as seen from Europe.

Click to read all past editions of ZhōngHuá Mundus

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This is an output of China Horizons, Bruegel's contribution in the project Dealing with a resurgent China (DWARC). This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON Research and Innovation Actions under grant agreement No. 101061700.