First Glance

The worst of both worlds for EU auto industry policy

A new Franco-German agreement risks undermining EU credibility and harming allies by easing climate efforts while endorsing a protectionist approach

Publishing date
20 October 2026
Simone et al 201026
Reading time: 3 min read

Franco-German initiatives used to be welcomed as an exercise in joint leadership that would strengthen the European project. Not this time. A statement issued by the Élysée on 16 October on “securing the future of the European automotive industry” marries the worst of German and French political instincts. As spiking diesel prices accelerate the uptake of electric cars, France has bowed to misguided German pressure to further relax a 2035 European Union target for car CO2 emissions cuts. Germany, meanwhile, has given up whatever was left of its credibility as a supporter of rules-based trade by endorsing the most restrictive possible version of ‘Made in EU’ preferences.

The Franco-German push turns two previously competing national positions into a common political demand. France and Germany cannot dictate EU legislation, but their combined economic and political weight puts considerable pressure on the European Commission and other EU countries to fall into line.

The Franco-German approach fails in three respects. 

First and most obviously, it could undermine climate objectives. The EU plans to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 90% by 2040 compared to 1990. The Commission is under intense pressure to review the main component of this effort, the emissions trading system (ETS), in a way that would put the 2040 target out of reach, and to postpone a separate emissions trading system for buildings and road transport. The Franco-German proposal on car emissions would make it even more likely that the 2040 target will be missed.

Second, it is bad industrial policy. Some temporary trade protection, in the form of safeguards consistent with World Trade Organization rules, is necessary to give the EU auto sector time to adjust to the second China shock and regain competitiveness. But protection alone is not a strategy. It must go along with incentives for the necessary corporate restructuring and technological upgrading.

The Franco-German proposal delivers the opposite. It would effectively extend the competitiveness trap that German carmakers got into when they bet on diesel and other internal combustion engine technologies. In the meantime, the rest of the world will move ahead and expand its lead in electric vehicles.

Third, the proposal is bad trade policy and even worse geopolitics. As the global trading system experiences unprecedented turbulence, the EU must nurture its alliances with likeminded countries and show its support for the rule of law. The Franco-German agreement does the opposite, pushing the EU to breach both its WTO commitments and its free trade agreements. Coming shortly after an increase in EU steel tariffs to 50%, ‘Made in EU’ subsidies and procurement preferences will fundamentally undermine trust in the EU as a reliable trading partner. The EU’s claim to be a defender of multilateralism will increasingly ring hollow.

There is a good argument to exclude subsidised Chinese production from public incentives in the EU. But the EU’s car-producing free trade partners – Japan, Korea, Turkey, Morocco and the United Kingdom – are not subsidised and should not become collateral damage. Under the Franco-German proposal, only the UK could, under very restrictive conditions, be assimilated to ‘Made in EU’ preferences. Yet, all five countries have developed beneficial trade and investment relationships with the EU, including closely interconnected value chains. European carmakers have been central for the development of car production in Turkey and Morocco, and the possibility that these countries could become entry points for Chinese assembly operations can be precluded by rules of origin applicable to the EV and its components. Without guaranteed access to the EU car market, Korea and Japan would have never concluded free trade agreements with the EU.

A better approach would be for the European Commission to be given a mandate to negotiate with any interested free-trade partner on guarantees of reciprocal access to both procurement markets and to incentives in support of electric vehicle deployment. This would ensure effective reciprocity for access to procurement markets with countries that have not yet made such procurement commitments, as is the case for Turkey and Morocco, and would create a much larger market to accelerate the clean industrial transformation of the car sector.

Such a partnership approach could be applied in other manufacturing sectors. The EU could offer its free trade partners, on the basis of reciprocity, future access to lead markets in clean steel. This would create an incentive for steel-sector decarbonisation investment on the basis of a much bigger market than that of the EU. It should go together with removing obstacles to trade in clean-steel intermediates, such as green iron ore.

Instead, the Franco-German endorsement of a protectionist industrial policy is a backwards step that will undermine the EU’s already fragile geopolitical credibility. The EU should instead embrace a less-defensive and more-ambitious ‘Made with the EU’ approach based on partnership and reciprocity.

This piece has also been published on Le Monde in French and Handelsblatt in German.

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