Why US designs on Greenland will ultimately end in compromise

President Donald Trump’s stated desire to obtain Greenland for the United States is not new, having been raised in his first administration (and by other administrations before that). In response, the Danish and Greenlandic strategy up to now has been to try to ignore Trump’s comments, in the hope he will move on to other topics.

However, Trump has refused to rule out military deployment to acquire Greenland (most recently on 9 January). The Danish and Greenlandic prime ministers have now spoken out about the unacceptability of the Trump administration’s comments.  European leaders have supported them fully in stressing that any US military action in Greenland would mean the de-facto end of NATO.

This European strategy is not directed at the Trump administration, but at the US Congress. The hope is that a majority remains in Congress able to rein in Trump’s designs on Greenland and to protect NATO. This supposition has received some support from an 8 January Senate vote to explicitly require Congressional approval for further US military action, in the wake of US intervention in Venezuela. Senators expect future votes on other jurisdictions, including Greenland.

Danish outreach to Congress is unlikely to stop Trump or members of his administration talking about Greenland, but it has helped defuse the risk of a military attack. Congress seems certain to act, restating its monopoly on declaring war – in this case on a Treaty ally of the US. The idea of a military attack is also extremely unpopular among Americans – which matters in a US election year. Only 8% of Americans would support “using military force to take control of Greenland”, while 73% would oppose.

The alternative of ‘buying’ Greenland offers some diplomatic negotiating space, but will also fail. Greenlanders don’t want to be treated as a commodity to be bought – relevant because a referendum on independence from Denmark would have to precede any acceptance of a US offer. Only 6% of Greenlanders want “to leave Denmark and become a part of the United States”. 

Furthermore, Denmark’s social security system, which applies in Greenland, is in most respects vastly superior to what US overseas territories have access to. Healthcare coverage is universal and free (versus ‘don't get sick’ in the US). University tuition is free with monthly government stipends for students (versus fees of thousands of dollars in the US). Paid parental leave amounts to about 52 weeks (versus zero federally in the US).

Poverty rates in Greenland are far lower than in American Samoa, the US Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico or Guam, and Greenlandic median incomes are higher. The annual Danish block grant to Greenland is worth almost €10,000 per capita. Joining the US might not be as attractive to Greenlanders as the Trump administration thinks.

In any case, a generous US offer is unlikely. It would have to amount to a Congressionally-approved and upfront-funded hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars per Greenlander. As 45% of Americans oppose purchasing Greenland, and only 28% support it, it seems extremely unlikely that any truly generous offer to Greenlanders could pass Congress in an election year, when the cost of living for Americans is already a major political issue.

It cannot be ruled out that the Danish and Greenlandic government will allow a referendum on independence and subsequent closer relations with the US. But, learning the lesson of the Brexit referendum, they would only do so in the firm belief that any offer would be rejected by Greenlanders – which anyway seems certain.

The aim for Denmark and Greenland is to run down the clock to the 3 November 2026 US mid-term election, after which Trump may have other political priorities. If Republicans lose control of either House, Congressional approval of any offer on Greenland could be ruled out.

An agreement could be put in place, however. The current Denmark-US bilateral defence on Greenland enables the US to put as many troops in Greenland as it wants. During the Cold War, the US had a very significant military presence in Greenland: at the peak, 15,000 troops and multiple bases and stations, compared to about 150 troops and one military base today.

Meanwhile, US investment in critical minerals in Greenland has never made commercial sense, given the high costs of Arctic extraction. If Trump, similarly to what has been mulled with regards to US oil company investments in Venezuela, offers US taxpayer money to subsidise or guarantee private investments in Greenland’s critical minerals sector, a better commercial case might emerge.

Therefore, the US has options for Greenland, far short of taking over the island. As the domestic political obstacles to pursuing military or purchase strategies will quickly prove prohibitive, Trump is overwhelmingly likely to take a different tack.