Updated assessment: Memos to the commissioners responsible for the internal market, industrial policy and competition

Published alongside Heather Grabbe and Jeromin Zettelmeyer's paper, 'Not yet Trump-proof: an evaluation of the European Commission’s emerging policy platform'.
The following text provides a follow-up to the memos to the commissioners responsible for the internal market, industry and competition, originally published on 4th September 2024. All Memos to the European Union leadership were collected in the book, 'Unite, defend, grow'.
The European Union’s central challenge remains raising productivity growth. To achieve this, the EU needs to break down remaining single market barriers and develop procompetitive industrial policy tools (Scott Morton, 2024b). We have argued that these tools should operate at EU level, that state aid rules remain essential to protecting the single market and that they should not be loosened (Poitiers et al, 2024, Scott Morton, 2024a). Trade policy should be supportive of industrial policy but stay within World Trade Organisation rules, as rules-based trade remains essential to EU growth and competitiveness. In the same vein, vigorous competition enforcement remains essential to business dynamism, entry and growth, but must be adapted to meet new challenges, particularly to protect competition in future innovation.
What changes as a result of Trump? Likely new tariffs will add to the cost shocks faced by EU producers, and reduction or withdrawal of support for Ukraine and international climate action would add to the EU’s fiscal burden. This makes a pro-growth agenda even more urgent but does not fundamentally change the elements of that agenda. The fact that US protectionism will now likely take the form of higher tariffs rather than subsidies reduces the pressure for a subsidy race with the US. The new US administration’s deregulatory agenda will also increase pressure on the EU to deregulate.
The European Commission’s approach. The mission letters suggest that the Commission will push Draghi’s (2024) innovation, regulatory and single market agenda. The Commission has also embraced Draghi’s push for industrial policy, calling for a “European Competitiveness Fund” and industrial policy focused on clean tech and the decarbonisation of industry (von der Leyen, 2024). But it appears to be less concerned than Draghi about protecting competition, calling for (1) “a new State aid framework to … deploy industrial decarbonisation and to ensure sufficient manufacturing capacity of clean tech”, and (2) “a review of the Horizontal Merger Control Guidelines to give adequate weight to … the time horizons and investment intensity of competition in certain strategic sectors” 1 Mission letter from Ursula von der Leyen to Teresa Ribera Rodríguez, Executive Vice-President-designate for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition, 17 September 2024, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5b1aaee5-681f-470b-9fd5-…. . While the Commission has stopped short of endorsing local content requirements as a condition for receiving subsidies, the mission letter to Executive Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné called for a “preference for European products in public procurement for certain strategic sectors and technologies” 2 Mission letter from Ursula von der Leyen to Stéphane Séjourné, Executive Vice-President-designate for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy, 17 September 2024, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/6ef52679-19b9-4a8d-b7b2-…. .
Assessment and updated recommendations. The Commission’s endorsement of Draghi’s innovation and single market agenda is welcome, but relaxing state aid rules and merger control in “certain strategic sectors” will weaken competition and harm the single market. To minimise these risks, the Commission should (1) stick to Draghi’s competition policy agenda, resisting the temptation to relax merger rules in order to promote European champions; (2) bolster any new state aid framework with a governance structure that coordinates industrial policy across EU countries and with EU-level policy, and ensures that it benefits all of the EU; (3) ensure that the proposed European Competitiveness Fund is deployed in a competitive fashion.
The Commission should also develop a framework for supporting the decarbonisation of energy-intensive industry that does not stand in the way of needed restructuring, including the shedding or relocating of production that is too expensive in the EU in the longer term. Finally, the Commission should eliminate or recast regulations that increase net costs while holding firm on regulations that protect society from harm – not mainly as a reaction to President Trump, but as part of a broader strategy to raise productivity growth.
References
Draghi, M. (2024) The future of European competitiveness, European Commission, available at https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en
Poitiers, N., S. Tagliapietra, R. Veugelers and J. Zettelmeyer (2024) ‘Memo to the commissioner responsible for the internal market’, in M. Demertzis, A. Sapir and J. Zettelmeyer (eds) Unite, defend, grow: Memos to the European Union leadership 2024-2029, Bruegel, available at https://www.bruegel.org/book/unite-defend-grow-memos-european-union-leadership-2024-2029
Scott Morton, F. (2024a) ‘Memo to the commissioner responsible for competition’, in M. Demertzis, A. Sapir and J. Zettelmeyer (eds) Unite, defend, grow: Memos to the European Union leadership 2024-2029, Bruegel, available at https://www.bruegel.org/book/unite-defend-grow-memos-european-union-leadership-2024-2029
Scott Morton, F. (2024b) ‘The three pillars of effective European Union competition policy, Policy Brief 19/24, Bruegel, available at https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/three-pillars-effective-european-union-competition-policy
Von der Leyen, U. (2024) Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024-2029, available at https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/political-guidelines-2024-2029_en