Updated assessment: Memos to the commissioners responsible for EU foreign, enlargement, and partnerships policies

Published alongside Heather Grabbe and Jeromin Zettelmeyer's paper, 'Not yet Trump-proof: an evaluation of the European Commission’s emerging policy platform'.
The following text provides a follow-up to the memos to the commissioners responsible for EU foreign, enlargement and partnerships policies, originally published on 4th September 2024. All Memos to the European Union leadership were collected in the book, 'Unite, defend, grow'.
The European Union has thrived in an environment of peace in Europe and rules-based international cooperation. These conditions have fundamentally changed. Russia continues to assault Ukraine and is bringing hybrid war into EU member states and candidate countries. President Trump is talking about territorial expansion as an objective of his administration. China and the United States have been undermining rules-based trade and the confrontation between them is likely to escalate. Resentment of the Western-dominated world order has grown in developing and emerging countries, yet there is no agreement among them on an alternative to the current governance architecture.
What changes as a result of Trump? Donald Trump’s return reinforces the trend towards transactional relationships, the weakening of rules-based international governance and a might-is-right mentality. The prospect of a reduced US role in European security and a worsening situation in Ukraine are encouraging faster EU common action, but some member countries would prefer bilateral deals that please Trump and Putin. Trump may not care about Ukraine and Moldova joining the EU, but there is a risk that Putin might ask for their membership to be held up as part of a deal with Trump on Ukraine. Trumpism might also affect enlargement by encouraging candidate-country leaders to push back against EU good-governance and anti-corruption conditions for accession, or to influence voters to support pro-Russian and anti-EU parties.
Trump’s anti-China policies will present the EU with difficult choices. As Chinese exports are redirected to Europe, US tariffs on China are likely to fuel demand for similar protection in the EU. However, the EU might find it has more in common with China than with the US on climate and the preservation of fundamental trade principles.
The European Commission’s approach. The EU is preparing for a tariff war with the US while standing by its enlargement, development and climate policies. The Commission aims to rapidly expand the EU’s defence capability and pay greater attention to economic security while preserving the rules-based system. Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has clarified that the role of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will neither gain nor lose responsibilities – the role of the Defence and Space Commissioner is largely additional and focused on the defence industry.
Assessment and updated recommendations. The Commission’s strategy is broadly right. But it is also narrow, particularly because it focuses foreign economic policy almost exclusively on security concerns and supply-chain resilience. The EU needs to take additional steps to get ahead of expected actions by Trump and Putin:
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Prepare options for a deal with Trump on Europe taking increased financial and operational responsibility for its own security, rather than wait for him to decide to change the US’s engagement with EU;
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Chart its own path in relation to China, treating China as a partner on climate change while reducing its vulnerability to hostile Chinese actions (economic and otherwise);
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Build new alliances with countries that continue to regard multilateral cooperation as beneficial, including Brazil, India and Indonesia. To do so, the Commission should be ready to align the EU’s formal weight within multilateral institutions with its diminished economic weight, conditional on major emerging countries committing to effective action.
With like-minded advanced countries, the EU must scale up the climate finance it provides to major developing countries, particularly for decarbonisation. As a major contribution to the global commons, this should not be financed from aid budgets. The EU also needs to develop a strategy to reconcile its industrial and economic-security interests with the development interests of its partners.
EU-level foreign, defence, and climate spending – including support for international climate mitigation – will have to be significantly expanded. This may require temporary common borrowing.