Three ‘don’ts’ to protect Greenland from Trump

"Those who surrender to Trump's tyranny invite more of it," argued former United States Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, early in the second Trump presidency. Reich's prediction is now proving correct. While the European Union and its member states try to preserve the transatlantic alliance and maintain US support for Ukraine, President Donald Trump’s repeated threats and the neo-imperialist world vision elucidated in the 2025 US National Security Strategy make the US-EU security relationship increasingly adversarial. 

Trump’s foreign policy adventurism – removal of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro and now threats against Greenland based on national security justifications – follow on from US tariff aggression in 2025. Will the experience of last year’s US-EU trade negotiations inform the EU’s approach to the current crisis over Greenland? In relation to tariffs, we previously identified three ‘don’ts’ when negotiating with Trump. While the Greenland issue has obvious differences – starting from the fact that Greenland is not an EU member, so the European Commission cannot lead negotiations on its future – these don’ts nevertheless remain relevant.

The first don’t is to not build and negotiate based on an optimistic central scenario. Trump behaves precisely in line with his declared intent, or else surpasses it. Counting on TACO (‘Trump always chickens out’) is a dramatic mistake. In the case of Greenland, the EU needs to take his comments on annexation at face value.

The second don’t is to never make concessions on substance based on promises of concessions on process. This is precisely what the EU did in April last year when it not only accepted a 10% baseline tariff in exchange for the postponement of the 20% reciprocal tariff, but also swallowed 25% tariffs on steel and aluminium, freezing its retaliatory measures on the latter as a sign of goodwill for the negotiations ahead.

The third don’t is to never rely on any deal as final. Again, the idea that swallowing a certain level of tariffs, albeit painful, would bring an end to uncertainty has proved delusional. Trump’s unpredictable preferences, coupled with strategic pressure – on digital services, for example – have led to a reopening of trade deal provisions that the EU had thought were settled.

The optimistic expectation that Trump will somehow ‘forget’ about Greenland after his comments in his first term has been shattered. The preference – as put by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio – to buy the island instead of using military means should not be seen as the beginning of de-escalation, but as confirmation of the US commitment to fully achieve its goals. The EU must prepare for a full push, not hope for compromise or transitory US interest.

Regarding the second don’t – a concession of substance in exchange for promises on process – Denmark and its European allies should not accept, for example, a referendum on Greenland’s future in exchange for non-binding negotiations in the framework of NATO. 

Finally, the third don’t tells us that any concession, for instance on US exploitation of rare earth minerals or expansion of the US military presence in Greenland, would not sate Trump’s appetites. Rather, it would confirm to him that he can get his way even with the most preposterous demands and would encourage further demands.

However, the EU and its governments should not only rely on respecting a series of don’ts. As a ‘do’, they should proactively protect Greenland from US expansionism. The EU has a rapid deployment capacity and it should be activated: military forces should be sent to Greenland, in agreement with Copenhagen and Nuuk, as a signal of Europe’s commitment to Greenland’s territorial integrity. 

While the US could annex Greenland despite the deployment of European troops, such an operation would be much more complex and of a very different nature to what was done in Venezuela. Moreover, while there would be no need for an armed confrontation, the spectacle of the US taking prisoner the troops of its closest allies would be sufficient to ruin US credibility, tarnish its international reputation and strongly influence the US public and Congress. Trump would need Congressional authorisation for such a military adventure and, more importantly, Congressional approval to fund it. It looks very unlikely that 60 US senators, just to satisfy the president’s vanity and delusions of grandeur, would support an operation that would end NATO, leave the US isolated and produce a huge win for strategic rivals such as China and Russia.

If European governments learn from experience and get their don’ts and do’s right, they can avoid bending the knee to Trump again and give credibility to the 6 January declaration by six EU leaders in support of Denmark against US threats. They would also lay the foundation for a more balanced transatlantic relationship.