Symbolic membership for Ukraine could bring practical security benefits to the EU

Amid mounting pressure to accelerate Ukraine’s progress towards European Union membership, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz wrote to EU leaders on 18 May arguing for the country to become an EU ‘associate’ member: given some symbols of membership first, followed by progressive application of EU law and budget programmes with safeguards. Although the country would remain legally outside the EU, Ukrainians would join in discussions in all the institutions, including the European Council, Council of Ministers, European Commission, European Parliament and even the Court of Justice of the EU.

The proposal would reverse the usual order for EU enlargement, in which institutional representation usually comes last. This is a radical idea that many EU governments view as dead-on-arrival, not least because it was clumsy of the Chancellor to make it without first gaining the support of other heads of government.

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy rejected ‘associate’ status and called for faster progress towards full membership. Zelenskyy – who already attends European Council meetings regularly – wants accession in 2027 on the grounds that Ukraine deserves membership for its war sacrifices. This is understandable, but unrealistic for EU members who are anxious to avoid disrupting the single market and community of law by allowing in a country before it can enforce the EU’s large rulebook.

Merz’s letter is sketchy on the idea of gradual integration into EU policies, no doubt because a Commission proposal for staged accession recently failed to gain the support of EU capitals. But it contains the germ of an idea that could eventually appeal to existing members: to use the opening of more EU programmes to Ukraine as a testing-period for the country’s implementation and enforcement before it is allowed in.

This has two merits. First, the prospect of reversible progress and losing funds deters backsliding by candidates and new members. Second, it sets a precedent for firmer conditions on EU funds that could apply to existing members too, reducing the opportunities for corruption and misuse that Viktor Orbán exploited while prime minister of Hungary. If the challenge of integrating Ukraine motivates the EU to get its house in order in these areas, it would improve the EU long before official membership.

There is also a major security dimension. Ukraine is already much more than an associate member of the emerging European security order. In Merz’s view, Ukraine would have a special status as a country at war. The country is a major security asset in defending EU countries from Russian aggression. Political representation for Ukraine could pave the way for deeper security cooperation, for which EU countries need Ukraine at least as much as it needs them. The European members of NATO are looking for ways to create an avant-garde group to enhance their cooperation, and Ukraine has major assets to offer.

Unlike many NATO members, Ukraine has a fast-innovating defence industry, rapid procurement system and a battle-hardened military. With the US disengaging and NATO closed to new members, Europe needs a new forum in which serious defence players with hard capabilities can work together to deter Russian attacks and sabotage.

Ukraine could help to create a new ‘European Security Council’, along with other non-EU members including the United Kingdom and Norway, to coordinate and take decisions for rapid reaction. Practical integration into defence planning and procurement could create a more credible deterrent than a security guarantee under Article 24.7 of the Treaty on European Union, which promises mutual assistance but lacks practical implementation.

The timing of Merz’s letter is also important: the “strong political agreement” he mentions as underpinning his offer (implying no legal changes to the EU’s treaties) would be important to cement the EU’s commitment ahead of the many elections in 2027, when France will elect a new president who could block Ukraine’s progress. 

Even if Zelenskyy and many EU capitals reject symbolic semi-membership now, they may come to recognise that symbolism has high value in countering the disillusion that usually sets in on the long road to EU membership. Enlargement negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova have been unblocked thanks to the change of government in Budapest, but it could take the best part of a decade for Ukraine to close negotiations because a candidate has to build the administrative and legal capacity to implement the EU’s full body of law and achieve its standards. For these reasons, Merz’s ideas may be revived to play a role in a future peace plan.