Peace through strength: why Europe needs a missile deterrent

On the night of 9 September, drones from a Russian attack on Ukraine crossed into Polish airspace. Some were intercepted; others crashed after running out of fuel. On 19 September, three MiG-31K aircraft transiting from Karelia to Kaliningrad intruded into Estonian airspace. These aircraft, able to carry hypersonic Kinzhal missiles, have been frequently deployed in a missile-carrier role against Ukraine.

The transfer of the MiG-31Ks demonstrates Moscow’s intent to station these aircraft close to vital targets in Europe. During the Zapad 2025 exercises in Belarus, Russia tested both land- and sea-launched versions of another hypersonic missile, the Zircon, capable of reaching Belgium from Kaliningrad. Russia has also announced it will build a facility in Belarus for the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile, which can reach anywhere in Europe.

This is the reality of Russia’s military machine in 2025. Russia continues to produce vast numbers of precision munitions despite years of sanctions. Its production has improved quantitatively and qualitatively, with growing numbers of increasingly high-precision drones and advanced missiles, including the Kinzhal and Zircon.

Europe’s air-defence capabilities are too limited to intercept large waves of missile attacks. European countries therefore emphasise integrated air and missile defence systems, for example through the European Sky Shield Initiative and the European Union’s ReArm Europe strategy. These efforts are critical for European security and deterrence but fall short in three respects. 

First, air defence is reactive and can be overwhelmed by large numbers of missiles and drones. The reality of modern air warfare is that precision is accessible to practically anyone, even non-state actors such as Yemen’s Houthis. The raw calculus of available interceptors versus launched missiles determines the outcome when two sides are matched technologically. It is still possible to achieve a technological edge. Israel, for example, neutralised Iranian air defences and operated in Iranian airspace during June’s Twelve-Day War. 

Europeans should not bank on this in any conflict with Russia. Unlike Iran, Russia has advanced integrated air and missile defence capabilities and a sizeable, modern and battle-hardened air force. Europe is rightly investing more – Germany plans to order 300 Patriot missiles, for example – but the numbers pale compared to Russia’s mass production of drones and missiles. When the war in Ukraine ends, Moscow can amass stockpiles beyond the interception capacity of European air defence.

Second, incoming missiles and drones are far cheaper than air defence. But even more important, the supply of defensive missiles is constrained. In the Twelve-Day War, for example, roughly a quarter of the US stockpile of THAAD anti-ballistic missiles was expended. It will take years to replace these. A European missile defence system just to protect critical infrastructure could cost €300 billion. In short, deterrence by air defence may not work given Russia’s substantial missile production capacities. 

Third, Europe cannot rely on US missile production. Current geopolitics aside, the US military industrial base is too limited, especially as the US commits increasingly to deterring China, which is fielding cutting-edge capabilities that match the US. The Pentagon is redirecting US air defence production to the US rather than allies.

What, therefore, should Europe do? It should learn from Ukraine’s campaign to degrade Russian capabilities through long-range drone strikes. But drone capabilities must be complemented with advanced long-range missiles. Modern cruise and hypersonic missiles are more difficult to intercept and so offer more effective deterrence. Furthermore, missiles are far more likely than drones to succeed in destroying targets vital to Russia’s military machine, including command centres, bridges and underground oil, gas and munitions facilities.

Having the capability to target such facilities would be a strong deterrent against Russian aggression. In contrast, the ability to maintain a sustained drone campaign against soft targets such as refineries, as Ukraine has done in 2025, impacts Russian state revenues in the longer term and cuts the availability of fuel for civilians, but lacks the immediate deterrent impact of targeted strikes that could significantly degrade the Russian military.

Europe must, therefore, look beyond deterrence through defence, to deterrence through strength. Stocks of missiles capable of reaching deep into Russia need to be increased, signalling a crippling cost for Russia in case of any attack on EU territory. 

European governments should order more from, and become more reliable long-term customers of, European missile producers. In addition, to fill military technology gaps relative to the US, EU defence procurement should accept the risks of investing in start-ups, paying for intermediate prototypes and guaranteeing future orders for new weapon systems that are tested successfully. That would enable accelerated development progress and scaled-up production. European production should also include hypersonic missiles, on which the US is lagging. Only such an approach will alter Moscow’s cost-benefit calculus and satisfactorily strengthen European deterrence.

A shorter version of this article was first published (in German) on 29 September in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.