The Irish ‘box’: the worst possible compromise for the EU budget
A new plan indicates that in both size and composition terms, the EU budget for 2028-2034 is heading in the wrong direction
Negotiations on the 2028-2034 European Union budget are entering the final stretch. Ireland presently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, in which member states meet. Ahead of a 15-16 October summit of EU leaders, Ireland presented a ‘negotiating box’ that is supposed to define the contours of the remaining negotiation. Unfortunately, this is an abject failure.
To understand why, one must go back to problems with the current EU budget. First, it allocates far too much to legacy items, particularly agriculture. Farm subsidies largely function as social transfers, which should be financed by EU countries. It also spends too much on territorial redistribution. While cohesion – the broad economic levelling up of EU regions – is important, cohesion spending should fall as poorer regions get richer and other common challenges mount.
Second, the EU budget is too small. Excluding funds for post-pandemic economic recovery, which are debt financed (the NextGenerationEU programme), the budget amounts to just 1.1 percent of EU GNI. Meanwhile, EU governments spend on average about 45 percent of GNI. Since many EU-level spending items – on research, climate, cross-border infrastructure, defence, industrial policy and foreign policy – are ‘European public goods’ (EPGs) that benefit all EU countries, this ratio makes no sense. The EU budget should be bigger and member-state budgets smaller, raising the overall efficiency of EU spending.
Such a restructuring requires significant planning and time. The 2028-2034 budget, planning of which started two years ago, could take a significant first step. And the European Commission’s July 2025 budget proposal in fact took a modest step by reducing the agriculture and cohesion spending shares while increasing allocations for competitiveness, defence and global action. The outcome would be a slightly higher overall budget: from 1.1% of EU GNI to 1.26%, including 0.08% of GNI for the increased servicing costs of NextGenerationEU debt, implying an effective increase in EU spending of just 0.08% of GNI.
The Irish plan would undo most of this modest progress. It would see the 2028-2034 budget cut by 0.1 percent of GNI, compared to the Commission’s proposal, implying even a marginal decline in non-debt service spending compared to the current budget as a share of GNI. Worse, the cuts would come almost entirely out of spending the EU should be ramping up (-15% relative to the Commission proposal). Legacy items including agriculture would survive unscathed.
This would fall far short of Europe’s needs. The 2024 Draghi report emphasised that Europe will continue to lag global competitors unless investment increases substantially. While the private sector should finance most of the investment gap, the public sector has an important role. Even under optimistic assumptions, the Commission’s proposal would fill only around one-fifth of the part of the EPG investment gap. Closing the EU-level component of the investment gap would require an increase of 0.6% of GNI relative to the Commission’s proposal.
How has the EU landed so far from what is needed? The blame should not fall on the Irish presidency, but rather the countries whose positions left Ireland with little choice. These are organised into two opposing groups: six ‘frugals’ led by Germany and 17 ‘friends of cohesion’ including Italy and Spain.
These groups have chosen to put their national interests above the European interest. The ‘friends of cohesion’ are right to push for an expansion in EU spending on common public goods but are not ready to accept a substantial cut in legacy spending to get there. The frugals argue correctly for a change in the structure of the EU budget in favour of EPGs, but also want a much smaller overall budget than proposed by the Commission.
Since both sides agree that Europe should spend more on EPGs, in principle the EU budget could be reoriented that way. The problem is that each group cares even more about its other objective: the 17 about protecting legacy spending, and the frugals about slashing the overall size of the budget as a share of GNI.
The result is the worst possible compromise. The frugals will get their smaller budget. The friends of cohesion will protect legacy spending. Spending on EPGs will undershoot substantially what Europe needs and what both the friends of cohesion and the frugals would want.
Getting out of this bind requires leadership from the large countries, starting with Germany and France. They should propose a different compromise that – at a minimum – keeps the budgetary envelope proposed by the Commission, while also requiring deeper cuts to legacy spending.
The resulting spending on EPGs would still be far too small to close Europe’s investment gap. But it would be significantly higher than both the current budget and the Commission proposal, and would signal that Europe can muster the political will to move in the right direction. The Irish ‘box’ signals the opposite.