International support to Ukraine is insufficient and declining

The passing of the fourth anniversary of Russia’s 24 February 2022 invasion of Ukraine was a reminder that what was intended to be a blitzkrieg style ‘special military operation’ has instead evolved into a protracted conflict. To survive against Russia’s much greater military, human, geographic and economic scale, Ukraine has been forced to rely on far-reaching support from Western partners, mainly NATO and European Union members. 

It remains in the strategic interest of Western nations to provide such aid, considering Russia’s unprecedented violation of the international order and its increasingly confrontational stance towards the West. Unfortunately, this aid has often arrived too late or in insufficient quantities to stop the aggression and push back Russia’s army. Ukraine has lost control of 13% of its territory, in addition to 7% occupied by Russia in 2014-2015 – and Russia still demands more.

However, in 2025, military aid to Ukraine was almost one-third lower than its 2023 peak, because of the stoppage of assistance from the United States under President Donald Trump. European aid increased significantly but was unable to fully replace the vanishing US support. Within Europe, the leading role was assumed by western and northern European countries, with assistance from eastern EU countries shrinking.

Late and insufficient military aid to Ukraine can be explained by the fear of confrontation with Russia, including a hypothetical Russian nuclear riposte, and by Europe’s limited military-industrial capacities. Instead, the US, EU, United Kingdom and other economies have concentrated on economic, diplomatic and personal sanctions against Russia. These are no substitute for military assistance.

Furthermore, the sanctions coalition has proved geographically limited, accounting for no more than 40%-45% of the world’s GDP in purchasing power parity terms. Most emerging-market economies have not joined. This has facilitated large-scale sanctions circumvention. Most Russian exports and imports, and some financial transactions, have been rerouted to countries that do not apply sanctions. 

Even within the sanctions coalition, it has been difficult to agree on details. EU sanctions packages are subject to the veto power of individual member states.

Advocates of sanctions underestimated the resilience of the Russian economy and its capacity to adapt to war conditions and manage adverse shocks. The forecasted collapse did not happen in 2022 when Russia experienced a limited GDP contraction of 1.4%. It still has not happened, despite analyses suggesting Russia’s near economic collapse. In 2026, Russia still has sufficient fiscal space to continue the war for another year or more.

Sanctions that target all Russians, including visa and travel restrictions and anti-money laundering regulations, can also be counterproductive. They strengthen the Kremlin’s domestic narrative about the war of the ‘collective West’ against Russia. They also help isolate Russian society from Western contacts and information sources. Finally, collective punishment is unfair when Russia’s last free elections were held in 1999-2000, and any anti-war protest risks long prison sentences and other repression.

So far, Europe and the US have lost the information war with the Putin regime. Russia’s disinformation campaign is spreading across Europe, undermining European solidarity with Ukraine and potentially even the foundations of European democracy. However, the attempt to reach out to Russian society with truthful information about the war has also been limited, impaired by the Trump administration’s suspension of, for example, funding for Radio Free Europe/Liberty in early 2025.

It is not too late to correct past failures and intensify military and financial support to Ukraine, concentrate sanctions on limiting Russian military capacity, fight Russian disinformation more effectively and provide Russian society with alternatives to official propaganda.

Most urgently, the Hungarian veto holding up the €90 billion loan to Ukraine, approved by the European Council in December 2025, should be overcome and the loan activated. Of this, €60 billion will be allocated for defence procurement. In addition, European Commission loans for defence spending – the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative – can and should be used by individual EU countries to support Ukraine’s defensive capacities.

The author would like to thank Stephen Gardner, Hans Geeroms and Jacob Funk Kirkegaard for their comments and suggestions on a draft of this commentary.