Europe’s geoeconomic and development objectives clash in Goma
Despite its critical mineral interests, the EU should be strict on Rwanda to maintain credibility and encourage conflict de-escalation

The crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with the capture on 27 January of the border city of Goma by the M23 rebel group, creates an uncomfortable challenge for the European Union. The M23 advance – another escalation of a conflict that has been ongoing for nearly three decades – is backed by Rwanda, with which the EU signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in February 2024 on developing sustainable and resilient value chains for critical raw materials.
The situation raises a fundamental question: can the EU reconcile its geoeconomic interests with its commitment to peace and democratic values? EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, has condemned M23’s advance and demanded that Rwanda stop its support (Rwanda has denied claims it supports the M23 rebels). But her statement highlights the contradictions in the EU’s approach: taking a strong diplomatic stance against Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC conflict, while also, through the EU’s mineral partnership with Rwanda, potentially undermining its credibility by reinforcing Kigali’s position as a key supplier of critical raw materials.
This is particularly the case because of concerns over the illicit mineral trade. Since early 2024, M23 rebels have gradually advanced and consolidated their grip over key parts of the DRC’s mineral-rich North Kivu province. The United Nations has detailed how M23 exploits mineral resources in eastern DRC, smuggling them to Rwanda, where they are mixed with Rwandan production before export.
The MoU with Rwanda is part of broader EU mineral diplomacy to improve its access to raw materials. According to the European Commission, the deal aims to deepen cooperation to, among other objectives, achieve sustainable and responsible production of critical raw materials. The EU’s Global Gateway – its investment initiative for developing countries – will provide financial support.
The clash between the EU’s objectives arises in part because of the approach the EU takes to aid. The Commission has declared that EU aid must serve the EU economic and geopolitical interest, but it also continues to insist that its partnerships serve the greater good, such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and democratic values.
The tension between these objectives is unlikely to ever be fully resolved. When international partnerships are driven by strategic interests, other objectives may be compromised. This is not new. However, the trade-off between geoeconomic interests and development objectives can be made less stark by employing separate policy instruments.
To strengthen its development impact, the EU must recommit to the promotion of the SDGs as the primary objective of the Global Gateway. At a minimum, Brussels should double down on strengthening traceability and due-diligence mechanisms to ensure that minerals sourced from Rwanda under the EU-Rwanda MoU do not include smuggled resources from DRC conflict zones. However, in light of the Rwanda-backed M23 advance in North Kivu and the illicit trafficking of minerals through Rwanda, the EU should reassess its deal with Rwanda and consider cutting aid, as it did in 2012 during the previous M23 conflict.
Stricter conditions would not only restore the credibility of EU development instruments but would also encourage Kigali to take steps toward conflict de-escalation. Aid still makes up a significant share of Rwanda’s government budget, though less than in the past. The presence of other powers in the region, including China, may push the EU to adopt a more transactional approach with Rwanda, but this should be weighed against the risk of further antagonising the DRC.
Donor coordination will help. Within the EU, greater coordination between member states is essential to ensure a unified approach. Diverging national interests risk undermining the credibility and effectiveness of an EU response. Other donors, such as the United Kingdom, have already signalled that Rwanda is putting its aid under threat, while the United States has called on the UN Security Council to consider measures to halt the M23 offensive.
Failure to address the tension between geoeconomic and development objectives will exacerbate perceptions of EU hypocrisy. This, in turn, could jeopardise EU efforts to secure access to critical raw materials, while also undermining Europe’s broader efforts to promote peace, governance and sustainable development.