EU enlargement momentum risks falling victim to veto power

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 seemed to change the attitude of European Union countries towards enlargement. The prospect of EU membership for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine was seen as a strategic move to avoid a geopolitical vacuum in the closest neighbourhood. Pro-enlargement momentum also brought new life to the stalled accession process in the Western Balkans. Most recently, the European Commission’s 2025 Enlargement Package, published on 4 November, mentioned for the first time tentative deadlines for concluding accession negotiations for four countries: Montenegro (end of 2026), Albania (2027), Moldova (early 2028) and Ukraine (2028).

However, the pro-enlargement commitment is showing cracks, despite the continuing war in Ukraine, Russia’s intensifying hybrid war against the EU and the weakening of United States security guarantees. The politics of EU enlargement have become increasingly hostage to domestic politics in some EU countries. This can translate into blocks on the enlargement process at each stage because enlargement is subject to unanimity in decision making (there are over 150 points during accession negotiations when vetoes could be exercised). Four prospective EU members in particular have become victims of the veto.

For almost 15 years, North Macedonia was blocked by Greece, which demanded a change in the country’s name. This obstacle was removed by the Prespa agreement of 2018, but in 2020, Bulgaria raised the issue of the supposed Bulgarian roots of the Macedonian nation and language, demanding changes to the North Macedonian constitution. North Macedonia has been judged ready to start the process of aligning itself with the EU legal framework (the acquis communautaire) but Bulgaria is blocking negotiations. 

Hungary’s government, meanwhile, is holding up the start of talks with Ukraine on parts of the EU acquis to do with fundamental rights and institutional issues, the internal market and external relations. It has also sought to sabotage various forms of EU aid to Ukraine. Moldova, which has been informally coupled with Ukraine in the enlargement process, is another victim of the Hungarian veto. 

Finally, Kosovo cannot obtain formal candidate status because five EU countries (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) have not recognised its independence.

The 4 November Enlargement Package was silent on these obstructions, instead sounding cautiously optimistic. However, given the Hungarian veto and other obstacles, only Montenegro and Albania seem to have good accession prospects, at least for now. Other candidates are less advanced in the EU accession process because of their domestic political problems. For example, democratic backsliding means Georgia is considered by the Commission “…a candidate country in name only”. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been paralysed by political crisis in the Republika Srpska and an inability to meet the conditions for EU accession. 

Two ideas have been floated to reduce the possibility of abuse of veto power in relation to enlargement. The first is associated with European Council President Antonio Costa. According to this proposal, decisions to start negotiations on different parts of the acquis could be decided by a qualified majority voting, while closing of negotiations would still require unanimity. It sounds like a reasonable compromise and is in line with what Bruegel has proposed. However, the legal route to adopting this change is not straightforward. Clauses in the EU Treaties that could permit sidestepping of unanimity requirements do not apply to enlargement decisions. 

The second idea sounds more controversial: admission of new members without full voting rights. They would not be able to veto decisions as incumbent members can. The intention is to soften the concerns of enlargement-sceptical EU countries. However, there would be no guarantee that this would reduce incidents of incumbents abusing their veto power. Furthermore, it would create two-class membership, possibly for a long time or forever. It would also be unfair because it would punish future members for the sins of incumbents.  

Enlargement is important strategically for the security, stability and economic wellbeing of both current and future EU members. The admission of new members must be merit-based and cannot depend on domestic politics in current members. The EU must rebuild consensus around its enlargement commitments and find legal ways to make the process faster and more predictable.

The author would like to thank Stephen Gardner, Hans Geeroms, Heather Grabbe, André Sapir, Nicolas Véron and Nina Vujanovic for their comments and suggestions on a draft of this commentary.