The costs and failures of air defence in the Iran conflict and what they mean for Europe

Despite the bombastic pronouncements of United States President Donald Trump, the balance sheet for the US and Israel in their attack on Iran is troubled. Iranian command and control structures have so far proved resilient, while Iran has hit three main types of target: Gulf and Saudi oil and gas infrastructure, US military bases in the region, and populated areas in Israel. Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed and oil and gas exports from the Gulf have collapsed, with lasting damage to production facilities

Meanwhile, the US has had to pull back from some of its 13 bases in the region, with radar and even aircraft targeted and destroyed by Iranian strikes. US aircraft operate at increasingly longer ranges, taking off far from the conflict zone.

Iran’s defensive strategy is imposing staggering military costs on the US. Gulf states have already expended hundreds of Patriot anti-missile interceptors – each costing $4 million – to shoot down Iranian Shahed drones, which cost at most tens of thousands of euros. Israel, faced with countering increasingly sophisticated Iranian ballistic missiles, must expend scarce Arrow 3 interceptors. 

Iran’s asymmetric warfare and use of precision-guided munitions change the financial equation between attack and defence. Drones and missiles capable of precise strikes were once costly and restricted to a handful of military forces. But developments in the last two decades have culminated in a strategic environment in which drones and missiles launched by Iran, as the attacker of the Gulf States and Israel, cost substantially less than the air and missile defence deployed by those countries – and some Iranian drones and missiles nonetheless find their targets with devastating effect.

Furthermore, in such a sustained campaign, production capacity is vital. In this respect, the calculus for the US and Israel is grim. They have burned through air-defence stockpiles, especially high-end interceptors such as Arrow 3 and THAAD needed to counter ballistic missiles. These stocks cannot be quickly replenished.

What is the lesson for Europe? Russia is a more serious challenge for Europe than Iran is for the US. Russia has a substantial air force and a highly sophisticated integrated air and missile defence network – unlike Iran which at the start of the war possessed only a rudimentary air force and limited modern air defences. Any wider conflict between Europe and Russia can be expected to play out as a more intense version of the conflict in the Middle East, with large salvoes of Russian drones and missiles saturating and eventually overwhelming European air defences.

For Europe, increasing the production and stockpiling of air defence is therefore critical. Europe needs to learn from Ukraine in organising air defence cost-effectively. It needs to invest in cheap counter-drone capabilities at large scale that would reduce the massive financial asymmetry between attack and defence. Ukrainian companies have developed cheap interceptor drones now sought after in the Gulf.

However, air-defence capabilities in themselves are not enough, as Ukraine and the Gulf states have learned. Russia’s defence industrial base can produce many more modern drones and missiles than even the highly advanced Ukrainian air defence can intercept.

The second lesson from Ukraine is therefore the need for counterattacks against military targets and production sites. Ukraine is increasingly successful in striking valuable targets inside Russia using domestically produced long-range drones and missiles. With recent strikes, Ukraine may have disrupted months’ worth of Russian drone and missile production, thereby saving millions in air-defence capacities. Ukraine has also hit refineries and defence suppliers, eroding the Russian government’s ability to sustain the war.

Europe should take note of these two lessons: air defence needs to be cheap and deep strike capabilities need to be deployed to damage production. Rather than a cost calculus in which every Russian missile needs at least two Patriot interceptors (or an equivalent such as SAMP-T), interception needs to be done at low cost, while the enemy’s munitions stockpiles and defence industry need to be targeted – as Ukraine has done.

This would flip the current asymmetric warfare calculus. Europe’s military leaders need to invest in massive stockpiles of cheap air-defence munitions, while building up large stocks of offensive drone and missile capabilities to disrupt production of attack drones and missiles. Learning these two lessons would help make Europe’s deterrence capability convincing.