External authors

Marshall Van Alstyne

Questrom Professor, Boston University; Digital Fellow, MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy

Marshall Van Alstyne is one of the world’s foremost experts on platform strategies and network business models. He is a frequent speaker, board level advisor, and consultant to both startups and global firms.
His research has received numerous academic awards and appeared in top journals such as Science, Nature, and Harvard Business Review. Interviews appear regularly across Bloomberg, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and National Public Radio. Prof. Van Alstyne is a research scientist at MIT, tenured professor at Boston University, and graduate of Yale and MIT. His consulting includes such firms as British Telecom, Cisco, Haier, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Pearson, and SAP. He holds multiple patents; and was among the first to measure individual dollar output from social networks and IT. His coauthored work, with Geoffrey Parker, of two-sided markets and platforms as inverted firms are now taught and applied worldwide.

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Working Paper

Platform mergers and antitrust

This paper sets out a framework for addressing competition concerns arising from acquisitions in big platform ecosystems. This is a June 2021 update of the same paper published in January 2021.

By: Geoffrey Parker, Georgios Petropoulos and Marshall Van Alstyne Topic: Innovation & Competition Policy Date: June 15, 2021
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Working Paper

Platform mergers and antitrust

This paper sets out a framework for addressing competition concerns arising from acquisitions in big platform ecosystems.

By: Geoffrey Parker, Georgios Petropoulos and Marshall Van Alstyne Topic: Innovation & Competition Policy Date: January 26, 2021
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Working Paper

Digital platforms and antitrust

The market power of online platforms raises concerns that they may engage in anti-competitive practices, but traditional (ex-post) antitrust intervention will be less effective in markets driven by network effects unless it is combined with a proper (ex-ante) regulatory framework. Intervention should not reduce value creation, should focus on fair sharing of value, and should eliminate incentives for anti-competitive strategies.

By: Geoffrey Parker, Georgios Petropoulos and Marshall Van Alstyne Topic: Innovation & Competition Policy Date: November 23, 2020