<![CDATA[Publication Feed]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sat, 19 Apr 2014 10:32:07 +0100 http://www.bruegel.org/fileadmin/images/bruegel-logo.png <![CDATA[Publication Feed]]> http://www.bruegel.org Zend_Feed http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss <![CDATA[Europe's social problem and its implications for economic growth]]> http://www.bruegel.org See also comment 'Interactive map: Europe’s social polarisation and the generational struggle' The European Union faces major social problems. More than six million jobs were lost from 2008-13 and poverty has increased. Fiscal consolidation has generally attempted to spare social protection from spending cuts, but the distribution of adjustment costs between the young and old has been uneven; a growing generational divide is evident, disadvantaging the young. The efficiency of the social security systems of EU countries varies widely. Countries with greater inequality tended to have higher household borrowing prior to the crisis resulting in more subdued consumption growth during the crisis. The resulting high private debt, high unemployment, poverty and more limited access to education undermine long-term growth and social and political stability. Policymakers face three main challenges. First, addressing unemployment and poverty should remain a high priority not only for its own sake, but because these problems undermine public debt sustainability and growth. Second, bold policies in various areas are required. Most labour, social and fiscal policies are the responsibility of member states, requiring national reforms. But better coordination of demand management at European level is also necessary in order to create jobs. Third, tax/benefit systems should be reviewed for improved efficiency, inter- generational equity and fair burden sharing between the wealthy and poor.]]> Tue, 01 Apr 2014 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Cross-country insurance mechanisms in currency unions]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 27 Mar 2014 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Rulemaking in Super-RTAs: Implications for China and India]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 10 Mar 2014 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The global race for talent: Europe's migration challenge]]> http://www.bruegel.org See also comment '"Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses"' In an ageing world with demographic and economic imbalances, the number of international migrants is likely to rise during the twenty-first century. The geography of migration flows is changing, however. Mobile people will be increasingly attracted by faster-growing economies. Therefore, some traditional destinations in western Europe will face stronger competition for skilled labour – not least from countries like China where the working-age population will shrink after 2020. At the same time, the sentiment in many European receiving societies is turning against migration and intra-European Union mobility. In the short run, Europe needs more labour mobility between EU member states given excessively high unemployment reported in some regions, while others face a shortage of skills. In the long run this will not be sufficient to close gaps in European labour markets. But many Europeans are not ready to accept more international migrants, and give their support to political parties with restrictive agendas. This creates at least three challenges. First: organising political majorities in favour of more proactive migration policies. Second: making Europe more attractive for mobile people with talent and skills. Third: moving away from unilateral migration policies towards negotiated win-win solutions aiming at reducing the costs of, and enhancing the welfare gains from, migration and remittances]]> Tue, 04 Mar 2014 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[European Central Bank accountability: how the monetary dialogue could be improved]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 03 Mar 2014 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Changing trade patterns, unchanging European and global governance]]> http://www.bruegel.org See also comment 'The World in 2020' The world economy is going through its biggest transformation in a relatively short space time. There have been many explanations for this phenomenon but the unprecedented scale and pace of this change and, most crucially, its implications, still seems little understood. In turn, there has been little preparation for, or adjustment to, this changing world, though if the change continues at this pace, the effectiveness of many global institutions in their current form will be threatened. We highlight the dramatic degree of the shifts taking place in world GDP and trade and include fresh projections of what world trade patterns might look like in 2020, should the trends observed over the past decade to continue. We also show the resulting shift in trade relationships for many key countries. European member states tend to have quite different trading partners’ profiles, and this heterogeneity is quite likely to become more pronounced with time. This, in turn, suggests a significant challenge for the effective functioning of the euro area and weakens the original rationale of its creation. If our projections to 2020 are broadly right, then many established frameworks for the running of the world economy and its governance are not going to be fit for purpose, and will need to change. The global monetary system itself, and global organisations such as the IMF, G7, and G20 are going to have to adapt considerably if they want to remain legitimate representatives of the world order. The alternative is their relegation to irrelevance.]]> Tue, 25 Feb 2014 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The long haul: managing exit from financial assistance]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 20 Feb 2014 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The Troika and financial assistance in the euro area: successes and failures]]> http://www.bruegel.org See also Blueprint 'EU-IMF assistance to euro area countries: an early assessment' This study provides a systematic evaluation of financial assistance for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus. All four programmes, and in particular the Greek one, are very large financially compared to previous international programmes because macroeconomic imbalances and the loss of price competitiveness that accumulated prior to the programmes were exceptional. Yet programmes were based on far too optimistic assumptions about adjustment and recovery in Greece and Portugal. In all four countries, unemployment increased much more significantly than expected. Although fiscal targets were broadly respected, debt-to-GDP ratios ballooned in excess of expectations due to sharp GDP contraction. The GDP deterioration is due to four factors: larger-than-expected fiscal multipliers, a poorer external environment, including an open discussion about euro area break-up, an underestimation of the initial challenge and the weakness of administrative systems and of political ownership. The focus of surveillance of conditionality evolved from fiscal consolidation to growth-enhancing structural measures. The Greek programme is the least successful one. Ireland successfully ended the programme in December 2013, but problems remain in the banking system. Exit from the Portuguese programme in May 2014 appears feasible but it should be accompanied by a precautionary credit line. It is too early to make pronouncements on the Cypriot programme, which only started in May 2013, but it can safely be said that there have been major collective failures of both national and EU institutions in the run-up of the programme.]]> Wed, 19 Feb 2014 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Inflation persistence in central and eastern European countries]]> http://www.bruegel.org This external publication is available though Taylor & Francis online (paywall).]]> Mon, 17 Feb 2014 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Pour une Communauté politique de l'euro]]> http://www.bruegel.org This text is also available as a blog post 'For a Euro Community' in English and as a pdf in French and German. The Eiffel Group: Agnès Bénassy-Quéré - Yves Bertoncini - Jean-Louis Bianco - Laurence Boone - Bertrand Dumont - Sylvie Goulard - André Loesekrug-Pietri - Rostane Mehdi- Etienne Pflimlin - Denis Simonneau - Carole Ulmer - Shahin Vallee.
Nous voulons susciter une prise de conscience en France mais aussi lancer un appel qui aille bien au-‐delà. Convaincus que Français et Allemands conservent une responsabilité particulière, nous partageons l’essentiel du diagnostic et des propositions du groupe Glienicker allemand.
Wir wollen das Bewusstsein in Frankreich erhöhen, aber auch einen Appell formulieren, der weit darüber hinausgeht. In der Überzeugung, dass Franzosen und Deutsche eine besondere Verantwortung tragen, teilen wir im Kern die Diagnose und Vorschläge der deutschen Glienicker Gruppe.
We want to raise awareness in France but also to launch an appeal which goes much further. We are convinced that France and Germany retain a particular responsibility in Europe, thus we share most of the diagnoses and proposals made by the German Glienicker group.]]>
Fri, 14 Feb 2014 00:00:00 +0000
<![CDATA[In sickness and in health: protecting and supporting public investment in Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org See also blog post 'In sickness and in health: protecting and supporting public investment in Europe' The long-term decline in gross public investment in European Union countries mirrors the trend in other advanced economies, but recent developments have been different: public investment has increased elsewhere, but in the EU it has declined and even collapsed in the most vulnerable countries, exaggerating the output fall. The provisions in the EU fiscal framework to support public investment are very weak.The recently inserted ‘investment clause’ is almost no help. In the short term, exclusion of national co-funding of EU-supported investments from the fiscal indicators considered in the Stability and Growth Pact would be sensible. In the medium term, the EU fiscal framework should be extended with an asymmetric ‘golden rule’ to further protect public investment in bad times, while limiting adverse incentives in good times. During a downturn, a European investment programme is needed and the European Semester should encourage greater investment by member states with healthy public finances and low public investment rates. Reform and harmonisation of budgeting, accounting, transparency and project assessment is also needed to improve the quality of public investment.]]> Fri, 07 Feb 2014 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[When and how to support renewables? Letting the data speak]]> http://www.bruegel.org See also blog post 'Does Europe need a renewables target?' Low-carbon energy technologies are pivotal for decarbonising our economies up to 2050 while ensuring secure and affordable energy. Consequently, innovation that reduces the cost of low-carbon energy would play an important role in reducing transition costs. We assess the two most prominent innovation policy instruments (i) public research, development and demonstration (RD&D) subsidies and (ii) public deployment policies. Our results indicate that both deployment and RD&D coincide with increasing knowledge generation and the improved competitiveness of renewable energy technologies. We find that both support schemes together have a greater effect that they would individually, that RD&D support is unsurprisingly more effective in driving patents and that timing matters. Current wind deployment based on past wind RD&D spending coincides best with wind patenting. If we look into competitiveness we find a similar picture, with the greatest effect coming from deployment. Finally, we find significant cross-border effects, especially for winddeployment. Increased deployment in one country coincides with increased patenting in nearby countries. Based on our findings we argue that both deployment and RD&D support are needed to create innovation in renewable energy technologies. However, we worry that current support is unbalanced. Public spending on deployment has been two orders of magnitude larger (in 2010 about €48 billion in the five largest EU countries in 2010) than spending on RD&D support (about €315 million). Consequently, basing the policy mix more on empirical evidence could increase the efficiency of innovation policy targeted towards renewable energy technologies]]> Wed, 05 Feb 2014 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Policies for seed and early stage finance]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 04 Feb 2014 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Commitments or prohibition? The EU antitrust dilemma]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 31 Jan 2014 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Banking Union and Beyond: Discussion papers for Brussels Think Tank Dialogue]]> http://www.bruegel.org
  • Single rulebook for the European financial market;
  • Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM);
  • Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), ideally supported by a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and a fiscal backstop;
  • Harmonisation of the Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS).
  • The stated rationale behind a European Banking Union is to preserve the singleness of the European financial market, to ensure consistent high-quality supervision and to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns. Discussion has been on-going for a long while at the academic, as well as the political, level and agreement (or preliminary agreement) has been reached on these elements. Borrowing conditions for sovereigns have improved markedly after the European Central Bank (ECB) introduced the new Outright Monetary transactions in September 2012, but the fragmentation of the European financial market induced by the crisis is far from being reversed. Starting in 2009 (and accelerating since 2010) Eurozone banks have been massively retrenching within domestic borders. This has led, especially in countries perceived to be weaker, to an impressive re-domestication of banks’ assets in general and of debt portfolios in particular. Doubts about the quality of banks’ balance sheets remain, still weighing on borrowing conditions for the private sector. Credit volume has contracted by 6% in the Eurozone since early 2010, and the worsening of financing conditions seems unevenly distributed across the EMU, with borrowing costs showing diverging dynamics along the peripheral-core divide. Due to their strong reliance on the banking sector, small and medium businesses seem to pay a disproportionately high price in terms of lending conditions not only because of the economic slowdown, but also because of deleveraging undertaken by the banks. The phase in of the SSM that will start in 2014 can help reduce uncertainty about the quality of banks’ assets and about the thoroughness of financial supervision, thus helping to address also the divergence in the private sector borrowing conditions. However, several questions remain open, which is the reason why the issue of banking union is due to remain topical in early 2014. First, some of the central elements of the ECB’s balance sheet-assessment exercise have not yet been decided (or they have not yet been communicated). These include, in particular, the treatment of sovereign debt, the magnitude of the stress test, and the treatment of systemic risk. The choices that will be made on these issues will potentially significantly affect the results. Uncertainty should also be dispelled about the rules that will apply to bank recapitalisation, bank restructuring and bank resolution in 2014 and thereafter, including how remaining recapitalisation costs should be distributed between national taxpayers and taxpayers of other European countries. Second, the recent deal on SRM leaves open the question of how far the present arrangements go towards achieving the stated aim of the banking union i.e. breaking the link between banks and sovereigns. The decision-making process envisioned in the proposed SRM Regulation is very complex and at least for the immediate future, no credible backstop is envisioned for resolution. The recent deal includes a commitment to establish a common backstop of 55bn by 2025 at the latest but during the transition the EU’s fund will be split into national compartments that will be merged over time. In the immediate future, the construction will not differ much from the status quo, meaning that the link between banks and their sovereigns would not be weakened and that different member states’ positions could still lead to potentially very large heterogeneity in the approach to financial sector problems]]>
    Tue, 28 Jan 2014 00:00:00 +0000
    <![CDATA[Supervisory transparency in the European banking union]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 03 Jan 2014 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Ending uncertainty: recapitalisation under European Central Bank supervision]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 17 Dec 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Can border carbon taxes fit into the global trade regime?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 09 Dec 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Life after Bali: renewing the world trade negotiating agenda]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 04 Dec 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Who decides? Resolving failed banks in a European framework]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 29 Nov 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Global and regional financial safety nets: lessons from Europe and Asia]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 20 Nov 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[A Schuman compact for the euro area]]> http://www.bruegel.org Ashoka Mody and published today by Bruegel, is based on the idea that since the very inception of the EU, Europe’s leaders have been unwilling to cross a threshold that compromised core national sovereignty. Instead, the solidarity visualized by Robert Schuman in his 1950 speech can be achieved through three agreements that allow national governments to move forward within a coherent framework.
    • The Fiscal Compact: The delegation of European fiscal governance to the European Commission has created complex structures that have encouraged costly delays, deceptions and half-measures. For this reason, fiscal policy should be the responsibility of the member states where the sovereignty lies. This concept is already present in the Fiscal Compact to which states voluntarily commit.
    • The Sovereign Debt Compact: To minimise the risk of excessive future sovereign borrowing, a credible “no bailout” regime must ensure that private lenders bear losses when sovereign debt becomes unsustainable. This will require writing the possibility of restructuring in debt contracts, using sovereign CoCos.
    • The Banking Compact: The current debate is focused on the intractable financing details of the complex banking union. But financial stability requires a much smaller euro-area banking system. The compact would encourage states to pro-actively downsize the growing crowd of zombie banks (using debt-equity swaps) while bolstering viable banks. A centralised banking union is desirable; but tackling the here and now must be the priority.
    Ashoka Mody’s Schuman Compact creates a decentralised resting stop to reflect on the best course toward a more stable, more integrated Europe. Continuing to stumble forward could lead to a debilitating, if not fatal, fall.
    I sincerely hope that this essay helps policymakers to reflect on the current approach to crisis resolution. Bruegel’s role as a think tank at the heart of Europe is to do exactly this: provide policymakers and citizens with new ideas and approaches to the most burning policy questions of strategic relevance. Decision-makers may decide to continue their current approach, to go forward with a strategy as outlined by me with colleagues of the Glienicker Gruppe, or decide to follow the path towards a Schuman Compact as outlined here. Reading well-argued pieces like this essay, and debating the central questions with the Bruegel community, will help in making the right decision. Guntram Wolff, Director, Bruegel Brussels, November 2013"
    Wed, 20 Nov 2013 00:00:00 +0000
    <![CDATA[Prospects for regulatory convergence under TTIP]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 04 Nov 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The Dragon awakes: Is Chinese competition policy a cause for concern?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Blog post 'China’s catching up on competition policy enforcement' China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, adopted in 2007, is largely compatible with antitrust law in the European Union, the United States and other jurisdictions. Enforcement activity by the Chinese authorities is also approaching the level seen in the EU. The Chinese law, however, leaves significant room for the use of competition policy to further industrial policy objectives. The data presented in this Policy Contribution indicates that Chinese merger control might have asymmetrically targeted foreign companies, while favouring domestic companies. However, there are no indications that antitrust control has been used to favour domestic players. A strategy to achieve convergence in global antitrust enforcement should include support for Chinese competition authorities to develop the institutional tools they already have, and to improve merger control by promoting the adoption of a consumer-oriented test and enforcing M&A notification rules.]]> Tue, 22 Oct 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Aufbruch in die Euro-Union]]> http://www.bruegel.org This text is also available as a blog post 'Towards a Euro Union' in English and as a pdf in French and German. See also the French Eiffel prosals 'For a Euro Community' on our blog. Glienicker Group: Armin von Bogdandy(Max-Planck-Institut for Comparative Law and International Law),Christian Calliess(FU Berlin),Henrik Enderlein(Hertie School of Governance),Marcel Fratzscher(DIW),Clemens Fuest(ZEW),Franz Mayer(Uni Bielefeld),Daniela Schwarzer(SWP),Max Steinbeis(Verfassungsblog),Constanze Stelzenmüller(German Marshall Fund), Jakob von Weizsäcker (Thüringer Wirtschaftsministerium),Guntram Wolff(Bruegel) Warum ohne mehr Integration weitere Krisen drohen. Elf deutsche Ökonomen, Politologen und Juristen – die Glienicker Gruppe – entwickeln Vorschläge für ein vertieftes Europa Krise, welche Krise? Nimmt man die öffentliche Stimmung in Deutschland ernst, dann gibt es wenig Anlass, sich über Europa noch große Sorgen zu machen. Die dramatischen Wochen, als man täglich mit dem Schlimmsten rechnen musste, liegen lange zurück. Die Finanzmärkte haben sich beruhigt. Die Konstruktionsfehler der Währungsunion scheinen entschärft, Ratspräsident Herman van Rompuy kann vor der UN-Vollversammlung in New York unwidersprochen behaupten, die „existenzielle Bedrohung des Euro“ sei „vorbei“ – und er ist nicht der einzige.
    Sans plus d'intégration, de nouvelles crises se profilent. Onze économistes, politologues et juristes allemands - le Groupe Glienicker - élaborent des propositions pour une Europe approfondie. La crise? Quelle crise? Si l’on prend au sérieux l’opinion publique allemande, il n’y a pas vraiment de raison de s’inquiéter pour l’Europe. Les semaines dramatiques durant lesquelles on craignait que l’euro s’effondre sont loin derrière nous. Les marchés financiers se sont calmés. Les erreurs de construction de l’Union économique et monétaire (UEM) semblent désamorcées ; le président du Conseil européen, Herman Van Rompuy, peut annoncer devant l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies à New York, sans être contredit, que « la menace pesant sur l’existence même de l’euro est derrière nous ».
    Without more integration, further crises are looming. Eleven German economists, political scientists and jurists – the Glienicker Group – develop proposals for a deeper Europe. Crisis, what crisis? If public sentiment in Germany is anything to go by, there is little reason to worry about Europe. The period when it was feared that the euro might collapse seems a long time ago. Financial markets have calmed down. The design flaws of the monetary union seem to have been papered over, and European Council President Herman van Rompuy was able to claim, unchallenged, before the UN General Assembly in New York that the "existential threat to the euro" is over.]]>
    Sat, 19 Oct 2013 00:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[Will income inequality cause a middle-income trap in Asia?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 10 Oct 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The European Central Bank in the age of banking union]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 03 Oct 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Manufacturing Europe’s future]]> http://www.bruegel.org edited by Reinhilde Veugelers
    Publication Launch 'Manufacturing Europe's Future'
    'Industrial policy is back!’ This is the message given in the European Commission’s October 2012 communication on industrial policy (COM(2012) 582 final), which seeks to reverse the declining role of the manufacturing industry, and increase its share of European Union GDP from about 16 percent currently to above 20 percent. Historical evidence suggests that the goal is unlikely to be achieved. Manufacturing’s share of GDP has decreased around the world over the last 30 years. Paradoxically, this relative decline has been a reflection of manufacturing’s strength. Higher productivity growth in manufacturing than in the economy overall resulted in relative decline. A strategy to reverse this trend and move to an industrial share of above 20 percent might therefore risk undermining the original strength of industry – higher productivity growth. This Blueprint therefore takes a different approach. It starts by looking in depth into the manufacturing sector and how it is developing. It emphasises the extent to which European industry has become integrated with other parts of the economy, in particular with the increasingly specialised services sector, and how both sectors depend on each other. It convincingly argues that industrial activity is increasingly spread through global value chains. As a result, employment in the sector has increasingly become highly skilled, while those parts of production for which high skill levels are not needed have been shifted to regions with lower labour costs. But this splitting up of production is not driving the apparent manufacturing decline.Participation in global value chains within Europe is strongly EU-oriented with a central position for the EU15 and in particular Germany in EU manufacturing. This internationalisationof production has resulted in deeper integration of EU manufacturing,withmember states specialising in sectors according to their comparative advantage.It has therefore helped to raise productivity and growth. As a result, the foreign content of countries’ exports has increased. Germany, in particular, has been able to benefit from the greater possibilities to outsource parts of production to central and eastern Europe and to emerging markets, and is in fact one of the countries with the smallest manufacturing share declines in the last 15 years. The Blueprint also highlights the importance of energy for the structure and specialisation of manufacturing. Capital-intensive manufacturing faces both urgent challenges and medium-term challenges. In the short-term, one of the most pressing problems is the fragmentation of financial markets in Europe,which undermines access to finance. This affects small to medium-sized firms in particular because they are the most dependent on bank credit. In some southern European countries, even the financing of working capital is endangered. It should therefore be a high priority for policymakers to fix Europe’s banking problems and create better functioning capital markets, including for venture capital. A second important conclusion is that, given the strong links between innovation,internationalisation and firm productivity, it is important to erase the dividing lines between industrial policy, single market policy, ICT policy and service sector policy. A highly integrated economic system needs a coherent set of policies that aim at improving business conditions everywhere. Attempts to promote one sector at the expense of another one are likely to result in significant inefficiencies and weaker overall growth. Governments are notoriously bad at picking winners. Instead, Europe needs policies that are conducive to a better business climate, less-burdensome regulations and the right framework conditions. Third, public policies need to be more supportive of industry and other parts of the economy. For example, the education system is of central importance for the economy and needs to be adapted to the needs of modern economies. The single market is important for both manufacturing and services and progress is needed to unleash its potential for growth. Reducing trade barriers is particularly important for industrial firms that increasingly rely in global value chains. Distortions in energy prices are also detrimental to industrial activity and should be avoided. ‘Manufacturing Europe’s future’ therefore means getting the policies right for firms to grow and prosper. It is not about picking one sector over another, but primarily about setting the right framework conditions for growth, innovation and jobs. Guntram Wolff, Director of Bruegel Brussels, September 2013]]>
    Wed, 02 Oct 2013 00:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[Memo to Merkel: Post-election Germany and Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org
  • Competitiveness adjustment is incomplete, casting doubt on the sustainability of public debt.
  • Banking remains unstable and fragmented along national lines, resulting in unfavorable financial conditions, which further erode growth, job creation and competitiveness.
  • Rising unemployment, especially among the young, is inequitable, unjust and politically risky.
  • Germany has a central role to play in addressing these risks. The new German government should work on three priorities:
    1. Domestic economic policy should be more supportive of growth and adjustment, with higher public investment, a greater role for high-value added services, and more supportive immigration policy.
    2. Germany should support a meaningful banking union with a centralised resolution mechanism requiring a transfer of sovereignty to Europe for all countries including Germany.
    3. The establishment of a private investment initiative combined with a European Youth Education Fund and labour market reforms should be promoted.
    Building on these priorities, a significant deepening of the euro area is needed, with a genuine transfer of sovereignty, stronger institutions and democratically legitimate decision-making structures in areas of common policy.]]>
    Tue, 24 Sep 2013 00:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[Does the European Semester deliver the right policy advice?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Economic and Monetary Affairs Commitee of the European Parliament. The July 2013 European Council recommendations to the euro area recognise a number of fiscal and macrostructural challenges, but do not fully exploit the options made possible by the European economic governance framework. There are particular problems with the Council's suggestions for the euro area as whole, which are not (or not adequately) reflected by the country-specific recommendations. A major drawback is that the Council recommendations do not give sufficient importance to symmetric intra-euro area adjustments. Reference to the euro area's ‘aggregate fiscal stance’ is empty rhetoric. Insufficient attention is paid to demand management.The most comprehensive recommendations are made on structural reforms. The July/August 2013 Article IV IMF recommendations on macroeconomic policies could also have been more ambitious, but they correspond better to the economic situation of the euro area than the Council’s recommendations. The President of the Eurogroup should continue discussions on the completion of the economic governance framework, including completion of the banking union and the setting-up of a euro-area institution responsible for managing the euro area’s aggregate fiscal stance.]]> Fri, 20 Sep 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The neglected side of banking union: reshaping Europe’s financial system]]> http://www.bruegel.org the informal ECOFIN in Vilnius on September 14. It discusses how Europe's financial system could and should be reshaped. It starts from two basic points: First, the banking system needs to be credibly de-linked from the sovereigns and banks should operate across borders. Europe needs fewer national champions. Second, other forms of financial intermediation need to be developed. Both steps require a significant stepping up of the policy system, including a single resolution mechanism. Together, this will render Europe’s financial system more stable, more efficient and more conducive to growth.]]> Sat, 14 Sep 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Electricity without borders: a plan to make the internal market work]]> http://www.bruegel.org
  • First, we suggest adding a European system-management layer to complement national operation centres and help them to better exchange information about the status of the system, expected changes and planned modifications. The ultimate aim should be to transfer the day-to-day responsibility for the safe and economic operation of the system to the European control centre. To further increase efficiency, electricity prices should be allowed to differ between all network points between and within countries. This would enable throughput of electricity through national and international lines to be safely increased without any major investments in infrastructure.
  • Second, to ensure the consistency of national network plans and to ensure that they contribute to providing the infrastructure for a functioning single market, the role of the European ten year network development plan (TYNDP) needs to be upgraded by obliging national regulators to only approve projects planned at European level unless they can prove that deviations are beneficial. This boosted role of the TYNDP would need to be underpinned by resolving the issues of conflicting interests and information asymmetry. Therefore, the network planning process should be opened to all affected stakeholders (generators, network owners and operators, consumers, residents and others) and enable the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to act as a welfare-maximising referee. An ultimate political decision by the European Parliament on the entire plan will open a negotiation process around selecting alternatives and agreeing compensation. This ensures that all stakeholders have an interest in guaranteeing a certain degree of balance of interest in the earlier stages. In fact, transparent planning, early stakeholder involvement and democratic legitimisation are well suited for minimising as much as possible local opposition to new lines.
  • Third, sharing the cost of network investments in Europe is a critical issue. One reason is that so far even the most sophisticated models have been unable to identify the individual long-term net benefit in an uncertain environment. A workable compromise to finance new network investments would consist of three components: (i) all easily attributable cost should be levied on the responsible party; (ii) all network users that sit at nodes that are expected to receive more imports through a line extension should be obliged to pay a share of the line extension cost through their network charges; (iii) the rest of the cost is socialised to all consumers. Such a cost-distribution scheme will involve some intra-European redistribution from the well-developed countries (infrastructure-wise) to those that are catching up. However, such a scheme would perform this redistribution in a much more efficient way than the Connecting Europe Facility’s ad-hoc disbursements to politically chosen projects, because it would provide the infrastructure that is really needed.
  • ]]>
    Thu, 05 Sep 2013 00:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[The euro area's tightrope walk: debt and competitiveness in Italy and Spain]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 03 Sep 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The ECB's OMT Programme and German Constitutional Concerns]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 29 Aug 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Sovereign debt and its restructuring framework in the euro area]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 12 Aug 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Inflation persistence in Central and Eastern European countries]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 22 Jul 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The response speed of the International Monetary Fund]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 17 Jul 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Banking system soundness is the key to more SME financing]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 15 Jul 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[A realistic bridge towards European banking union]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 27 Jun 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Central bank cooperation during the great recession]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 20 Jun 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[EU-IMF assistance to euro area countries: an early assessment]]> http://www.bruegel.org Read update 'The Troika and financial assistance in the euro area: successes and failures' (coming 19/02) Three years ago, in May 2010, Greece became the first euro-area country to receive financial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund in exchange for implementing an economic programme designed by the Troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF. Within a year, Ireland and Portugal went down the same path. This study provides an early evaluation of these assistance programmes implemented by the Troika in these three countries. The study assesses the economic impact of the programmes and the consequences of their particular institutional set-up.]]> Mon, 17 Jun 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Bank versus non-bank credit in the United States, Europe and China]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 05 Jun 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Do European Union fines deter price-fixing?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Deleveraging and global growth]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 25 Apr 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[EU-Korea Economic Exchange]]> http://www.bruegel.org Zsolt Darvas, Bruegel April 2013 ]]> Tue, 23 Apr 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Europe's growth problem (and what to do about it)]]> http://www.bruegel.org here.]]> Fri, 12 Apr 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[You'd better bet on the ETS]]> http://www.bruegel.org Policy challenge The ETS must be stabilised by reinforcing the credibility of the system so that the use of existing low-carbon alternatives (for example burning gas instead of coal) is incentivised and investment in low-carbon assets is ensured. Further-more, failure to reinvigorate the ETS might compromise the cost-effective synchronisation of European decarbonisation efforts across sectors and countries. To restore credibility and to ensure long-term commitment to the ETS, the European Investment Bank should auction guarantees on the future emission allowance price.This will reduce the risk for low-carbon investments and enable stabilisation of the ETS until a compromise is found on structural measures to reinforce it in order to achieve the EU's long-term decarbonisation targets.]]> Tue, 09 Apr 2013 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The changing landscape of financial markets in Europe, the United States and Japan]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 18 Mar 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 13 Mar 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Electricity infrastructure: More border crossings or a borderless Europe?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 22 Feb 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[From supervision to resolution: next steps on the road to European banking union]]> http://www.bruegel.org Listen to the press conference call. The European Council has outlined the creation of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), complementing the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The thinking on the SRM’s legal basis, design and mission is still preliminary and depends on other major initiatives, including the European Stability Mechanism’s involvement in bank recapitalisations and the Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRR) Directive. The SRM should also not be seen as the final step creating Europe’s future banking union. Both the BRR Directive and the SRM should be designed to enable the substantial financial participation of existing creditors in future bank restructurings. To be effective, the SRM should empower a central body. However, in the absence of Treaty change and of further fiscal integration, SRM decisions will need to be implemented through national resolution regimes. The central body of the SRM should be either the European Commission, or a new authority. This legislative effort should not be taken as an excuse to delay decisive action on the management and resolution of the current European banking fragility, which imposes a major drag on Europe’s growth and employment.]]> Mon, 18 Feb 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Can Europe recover without credit?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 15 Feb 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[European antitrust control and standard setting]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 06 Feb 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Standard-setting abuse: the case for antitrust control]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 06 Feb 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The World innovation landscape: Asia rising?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 01 Feb 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Options for a Euro-area fiscal capacity]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 10 Jan 2013 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Private long-term investment in uncertain times]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 19 Dec 2012 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Policy Lessons from the Eurozone Crisis]]> http://www.bruegel.org Co-authored by Chiara Angeloni, Silvia Merler and Guntram Wolff. The current European crisis has shed light on several weaknesses and the institutional incompleteness characterizing the euro area. The manifestation of Europe's fragility was preceded by a large build-up of debt in the private sector, associated with national current account divergences and the deterioration of competitiveness particularly of the euro periphery countries. With the economic situation deteriorating, private sector debt became less credible, contaminating banks' balance sheets and placing a heavy burden on governments. A sovereign-bank vicious circle emerged: on the one hand, with banking risk translating into higher sovereign risk because of the governments' guarantor role and, on the other hand, with the deterioration of government's creditworthiness affecting the banking systems through banks' sovereign bond holdings. In principle, this negative feedback can be stopped by breaking one of the channels of transmission. A banking union at the European level is proposed as one solution. Published in 'The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs'. See the original publication in English here.]]> Thu, 13 Dec 2012 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[A budget for Europe's monetary union]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 03 Dec 2012 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Smart choices for growth]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 28 Nov 2012 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The long-term EU budget: size or flexibility?]]> http://www.bruegel.org • To improve flexibility a commitment device should be created that places the EU budget above continuous political disagreement. We suggest the creation of a European Growth Fund, on the basis of which the European Commission should be allowed to borrow on capital markets to anticipate pre-allocated EU expenditure, such as Structural and Cohesion Funds. Markets would thus be a factor in EU budget policymaking, with a potentially disciplining effect. Attaching conditionality to this type of disbursement appears legitimate, as capital delivered in this way is a form of assistance.]]> Fri, 23 Nov 2012 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[On the effectiveness and legitimacy of EU economic policies]]> http://www.bruegel.org This policy brief was presented to the Assemblée nationale of France on the 19th February 2014.]]> Fri, 09 Nov 2012 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The Greek debt trap: an escape plan]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 09 Nov 2012 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Assurance mutuelle ou fédéralisme: la zone euro entre deux modèles]]> http://www.bruegel.org Published in Journées de l'economie de Lyon 2012]]> Wed, 07 Nov 2012 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The known unknowns and the unknown unknowns of the EMU]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 26 Oct 2012 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The euro crisis: ten roots, but fewer solutions]]> http://www.bruegel.org This Policy contribution was published in 'The Aftermath of the Global Crisis in the European Union' in May 2013. Many factors have contributed to the euro crisis. Some have been addressed by policymakers, even if belatedly, and European Union member states have been willing to improve the functioning of the euro area by agreeing to relinquish national sovereignty in some important areas. However, the most pressing issue threatening the integrity, even the existence, of the euro, has not been addressed: the deepening economic contraction in southern euro-area member states. The common interest lies in preserving the integrity of the euro area and in offering these countries improved prospects. Domestic structural reform and appropriate fiscal consolidation, wage increases and slower fiscal consolidation in economically stronger euro-area countries, a weaker euro exchange rate, debt restructuring and an investment programme should be part of the arsenal. In the medium term, more institutional change will be necessary to complement the planned overhaul of the euro area institutional framework. This will include the deployment of a euro-area economic stabilising tool, managing the overall fiscal stance of the euro area, some form of Eurobonds and measures to make euro-area level decision making bodies more effective and democratically legitimate.]]> Fri, 19 Oct 2012 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The growth effects of EU cohesion policy: a meta-analysis]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 11 Oct 2012 10:15:49 +0100 <![CDATA[The EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-Unicredit dataset ]]> http://www.bruegel.org • The database, for the first time in Europe, combines measures of firms’ international activities (eg exports, outsourcing, FDI, imports) with quantitative and qualitative information on about 150 items ranging from R&D and innovation, labour organisation, financing and organisational activities, and pricing behaviour. Data consists of a representative sample (at the country level for the manufacturing industry) of almost 15,000 surveyed firms (above 10 employees) in seven European economies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Austria, Hungary). Data was collected in 2010, covering the years from 2007 to 2009. Special questions related to the behaviour of firms during the crisis were also included in the survey. • We illustrate the construction and usage of the dataset, capitalising on the experience of researchers who have exploited the data within the EFIGE project. Importantly, the document also reports a comprehensive set of validation measures that have been used to assess the comparability of the survey
    data with official statistics. A set of descriptive statistics describing the EFIGE variables within (and across) countries and industries is also provided.]]>
    Thu, 04 Oct 2012 14:45:04 +0100
    <![CDATA[Europe's single supervisory mechanism and the long journey towards banking union]]> http://www.bruegel.org This Policy Contribution was prepared as a briefing paper for the European Parliament Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee’s Monetary Dialogue.]]> Thu, 04 Oct 2012 09:55:30 +0100 <![CDATA[An Assessment of the European Semester]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 01 Oct 2012 17:10:46 +0100 <![CDATA[The euro crisis and the new impossible trinity]]> http://www.bruegel.org Moneda y Credito 234/2012. This external paper draws from the Bruegel Policy Contribution The Euro crisis and the new impossible trinity released on 15th January 2012. Introduction Since the euro crisis erupted in early 2010, the European policy discussion has mostly emphasised its fiscal roots. Beyond short term assistance, reflection on reform has focused on the need to strengthen fiscal frameworks at European Union and national levels. The sequence of decisions and proposals is telling:
    • In 2011, the EU adopted new legislation, effective from 1 January 2012, that reinforces preventive action against fiscal slippages, sets minimum requirements for national fiscal frameworks, toughens sanctions against countries in excessive deficit and tightens up enforcement through a change in the voting procedure.
    • On 26 October 2011, the euro area heads of state and government decided to go further and committed themselves to adopting constitutional or near-constitutional rules on balanced budgets in structural terms, to basing national budgets on independent forecasts and, for countries in an excessive deficit procedure, to allowing examination of draft budgets by the European Commission before they are adopted by parliaments. A few weeks later, in November 2011, the European Commission put forward proposals for new legislation (the "two-pack") requiring euro area member states to give the Commission the right to assess, and request revisions to, draft national budgets before they are adopted by parliament.

    • Speaking in the European Parliament in early December, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi asked for a “new fiscal compact” which he defined as “a fundamental restatement of the fiscal rules together with the mutual fiscal commitments that euro area governments have made”, so that these commitments “become fully credible, individually and collectively”.

    • On 9 December 2011, EU heads of states and government, with the significant exception of the United Kingdom, committed themselves to introducing fiscal rules stipulating that the general government deficit must not exceed 0.5 percent of GDP in structural terms. They also agreed on a new treaty that would allow automatic activation of the sanction procedure for countries in breach of the 3 percent of GDP ceiling for budgetary deficits. Sanctions as recommended by the European Commission will be adopted unless a qualified majority of euro area member states is opposed.
    The question is, are the Europeans right to see the strengthening of the fiscal framework as the main, possibly the only precondition for restoring trust in the euro? Or is this emphasis misguided? It is striking that in spite of a growing body of literature drawing attention to the non-fiscal aspects of the development of the crisis, other problems that emerged during the euro crisis have almost disappeared from the policy discussion at top level. Credit booms and the perverse effects of negative real interest rates in countries where credit to the non-traded sector gave rise to a sustained rise in inflation were the focus of policy discussions in the aftermath of the global crisis, but these issues are barely discussed at head-of-state level. Real exchange rate misalignments within the euro area, and current-account imbalances, are largely considered to be either of lesser importance, or only symptoms of the underlying fiscal imbalances. Finally, the role of capital flows
    from northern to southern Europe and their sudden reversal, are merely discussed by academics and central bankers, although the sudden reversal of north-south capital flows inside the euro area is fragmenting the single market and creating major imbalances within the Eurosystem of central banks.]]>
    Wed, 26 Sep 2012 10:36:24 +0100
    <![CDATA[Fiscal rules: Timing is everything]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 17 Sep 2012 15:09:11 +0100 <![CDATA[The fiscal implications of a banking union]]> http://www.bruegel.org The findings of this paper were presented at the Informal ECOFIN in Nicosia on 14 September 2012.]]> Fri, 14 Sep 2012 15:09:31 +0100 <![CDATA[Intra-euro rebalancing is inevitable but insufficient]]> http://www.bruegel.org
  • The share of intra-euro trade has declined.
  • Intra-euro trade balances have already adjusted to a great extent.
  • The intra-euro real exchange rates of Greece, Portugal and Spain have also either already adjusted or do not indicate significant appreciations since 2000.
  • There are only two main current account surplus countries, Germany and the Netherlands.
  • A purely intra-euro adjustment strategy would require too-significant wage increases in northern countries and wage declines in southern countries, which do not seem to be feasible.
  • Before the crisis, the euro was significantly overvalued despite the close-to balanced current account position. The euro has depreciated recently, but more is needed to support the extra-euro trade of southern euro-area members. A weaker euro would also boost exports, growth, inflation and wage increases in Germany, thereby helping further intra-euro adjustment and the survival of the euro.]]>
    Fri, 31 Aug 2012 11:27:17 +0100
    <![CDATA[New ICT sectors: Platforms for European growth?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 29 Aug 2012 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Breaking down the barriers to firmgrowth in Europe The fourth EFIGE policy report]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 28 Aug 2012 11:30:56 +0100 <![CDATA[Money demand in the euro area: new insights from disaggregated data]]> http://www.bruegel.org https://springerlink3.metapress.com/content/gq60432737628667/resource-secured/?target=fulltext.pdf&sid=dzqotsigt4ocxztxxyee3jg0&sh=www.springerlink.com]]> Tue, 21 Aug 2012 11:41:46 +0100 <![CDATA[The challenges of Europe's fourfold union]]> http://www.bruegel.org This Policy Contribution reproduces Nicolas Véron’s statement delivered at the hearing on 'The Future of the Eurozone: Outlook and Lessons' at the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in Washington DC on 1 August 2012.]]> Thu, 16 Aug 2012 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The simple macroeconomics of North and South in EMU]]> http://www.bruegel.org
  • The differential fiscal stance between North and South is what determines real exchange rate changes. South therefore needs to tighten more. There is no escape from relative austerity.

  • If monetary policy aims at keeping inflation stable in the North and the initial debt is above a certain threshold, debt dynamics are perverse: fiscal retrenchment is self-defeating;

  • If monetary policy targets average inflation instead, which implies higher inflation in the North, the initial debt threshold above which the debt dynamics become perverse is higher. Accepting more inflation at home is therefore a way for the North to contribute to restoring debt sustainability in the South.

  • Structural reforms in the South improve the debt dynamics if the initial debt is not too high. Again, targeting average inflation rather than inflation in the North helps strengthen the favourable effects of structural reforms.
  • ]]>
    Mon, 30 Jul 2012 12:05:32 +0100
    <![CDATA[Transatlantic economic challenge in an era of growing multipolarity]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 24 Jul 2012 12:49:39 +0100 <![CDATA[Golden Growth: Restoring the lustre of the European economic model]]> http://www.bruegel.org http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/0,,contentMDK:23069550~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258599,00.html
    The report documents the impressive achievements of the European growth model over the last 50 years. Accounting for the stresses it is experiencing and assessing the longer-term challenges that Europe will face, the report then evaluates the six principal components of the model: Trade, Finance, Enterprise, Innovation, Labor, and Government. It finds that the European growth model has been a powerful engine for economic convergence, helping developing countries in Europe catch up to their richer neighbors and become high-income economies. But recent changes in and outside Europe necessitate change. The report proposes the adjustments needed to make trade and finance work even better, to encourage enterprise and innovation in parts of Europe which have begun to lag, and address shortcomings in the functioning of labor markets and governments. The changes proposed would restart the European convergence machine, make Europe's enterprises competitive, and help Europeans afford the highest standards of living in the world.
    Fri, 20 Jul 2012 00:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[Monetary transmission in three central European economies: evidence from time-varying coefficient vector autoregressions]]> http://www.bruegel.org A version of the Bruegel Working Paper Monetary transmission in three central European economies: evidence from time-varying coefficient vector autoregressions has been published in Empirica We study the transmission of monetary policy to macroeconomic variables with structural time-varying coefficient vector autoregressions in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, in comparison with that in the euro area. These three countries have experienced changes in monetary policy regimes and went through substantial structural changes, which call for the use of a time-varying parameter analysis. Our results indicate that the impact on output of a monetary shock changed over time. At the point of the last observation of our sample, the fourth quarter of 2011, among the three countries, monetary policy was most powerful in Poland and not much less strong than the transmission in the euro area. We discuss various factors that can contribute to differences in monetary transmission, such as financial structure, labour market rigidities, industry composition, exchange rate regime, credibility of monetary policy and trade openness. ]]> Thu, 19 Jul 2012 16:29:26 +0100 <![CDATA[The triggers of competitiveness: The EFIGE cross-country report]]> http://www.bruegel.org Competitiveness is one of the most debated issues in policy circles. But, what triggers it? Capitalising on the first existing harmonised cross-country dataset measuring the entire range of international activities of firms in seven European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom), we first confirm a number well-established results of the firm heterogeneity literature. Secondly, and more importantly, we identify several innovational, financial, organizational and managerial triggers of competitiveness at firm level. Finally, we argue that enhancing-competitiveness policymaking could be improved by firm-level evidence if there were less reluctance to the use of micro-founded indicators to inform policy decisions.

    Tue, 17 Jul 2012 10:57:04 +0100
    <![CDATA[Productivity, labour cost and export adjustment: Detailed results for 24 EU countries]]> http://www.bruegel.org Compositional effects on productivity, labour cost and export adjustment’, this working paper presents detailed results for 24 EU countries on: • The sectoral changes in the economy;
    • The unit labour costs (ULC) based real effective exchange rate (REER) and its main components;
    • Export performance. The ULC-REERs are calculated: • For the total economy, the business sector (excluding agriculture, construction and real estate activities), and some main sectors;
    • Using both actual aggregates and fixed-weight aggregates, as the latter are free from the impacts of compositional changes;
    • Against 30 trading partners and against three subsets of trading partners: euro-area, non-euro area EU, non-EU.
    • The REERs calculated in this paper are freely downloadable.]]>
    Thu, 12 Jul 2012 12:08:50 +0100
    <![CDATA[Paths to eurobonds]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 03 Jul 2012 18:47:41 +0100 <![CDATA[The creation of euro area financial safety nets]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 02 Jul 2012 18:31:33 +0100 <![CDATA[What kind of European banking union?]]> http://www.bruegel.org This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

    Mon, 25 Jun 2012 08:51:56 +0100
    <![CDATA[Compositional effects on productivity, labour cost and export adjustments]]> http://www.bruegel.org , Zsolt released the working paper Productivity, labour cost and export adjustment: Detailed results for 24 EU countries which presents detailed results for 24 EU countries on: sectoral changes in the economy;Unit labour costs (ULC) based real effective exchange rate (REER) and its main components; Export performance.]]> Fri, 22 Jun 2012 15:40:30 +0100 <![CDATA[ICT for growth: a targeted approach]]> http://www.bruegel.org
  • This Policy Contribution assesses the broad obstacles hampering ICT-led growth in Europe and identifies the main areas in which policy could unlock the greatest value. We review estimates of the value that could be generated through take-up of various technologies and carry out a broad matching with policy areas.
    • According to the literature survey and the collected estimates, the areas in which the right policies could unlock the greatest ICT-led growth are product and labour market regulations and the European Single Market. These areas should be reformed to make European markets more flexible and competitive. This would promote wider adoption of modern data-driven organisational and management practices thereby helping to close the productivity gap between the United States and the European Union.
    • Gains could also be made in the areas of privacy, data security, intellectual property and liability pertaining to the digital economy, especially cloud computing, and next generation network infrastructure investment.
    Standardisation and spectrum allocation issues are found to be important, though to a lesser degree. Strong complementarities between the analysed technologies suggest, however, that policymakers need to deal with all of the identified obstacles in order to fully realise the potential of ICT to spur long-term growth beyond the partial gains that we report.]]>
    Wed, 20 Jun 2012 14:27:47 +0100
    <![CDATA[Investment and growth in the time of climate change]]> http://www.bruegel.org See also comment 'Investment and growth in the time of climate change' Climate scientists mostly agree that, if current trends continue, global greenhouse-gas emissions are very likely to result in dangerous interference by mankind in the earth’s climate. Against this background, the world community has set itself the goal of limiting the increase in the global average temperature by the end of this century to no more than 2°C compared to pre-industrial times. To get there, global emissions will have to fall substantially.
    Largely focussing on the European dimension of this goal, this report considers investment and economic growth on a greenhouse-gas emissions trajectory that breaks with the past. Investment-related questions that this report pursues include: how should Europe properly balance investment in mitigating greenhouse-gas emissions and adaptation to climate change? How urgent is it to invest in both? How do global cooperation on climate action and fear of climate catastrophe impact on the balance between mitigation and adaptation? What are the key obstacles to climate investment? Which policies promise to remove these obstacles and make investment profitable, thereby encouraging investment finance? What are the respective roles of the private and the public sector? Growth-related questions include: how are climate action and economic growth linked and, specifically,what is the role of innovation? Are there only trade-offs between climate action and growth or are therewin-wins, too? Can climate action help Europe emerge from its economic crisis? How can climate action be made as growth-friendly as possible? In addressing these questions, this report takes an economic perspective. More specifically, at the heart of the analysis is the quest for economic efficiency. Not surprisingly for this type of analysis, a key theme running through the report is one of trade-offs and difficult choices that society needs to make. Cognisant of the fact that markets left alone will not make economically efficient choices, another common theme is the role of government policies in bringing about efficient outcomes. Considering trade-offs and government policy together, the key message from this report is that there is unexploited scope for making Europe’s climate action more efficient, growth-friendly, and in tune with fiscal constraints.
    The report is the result of a joint research effort by the Economics Department of the European Investment Bank and Bruegel. It is our hope that it will help to clarify some of the complexities involved in designing effective policies to address climate change without sacrificing too much economic growth, in a world in which international cooperation on climate action is so difficult to achieve.]]>
    Thu, 14 Jun 2012 00:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[Macroeconomic coordination: what has the G-20 achieved?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 05 Jun 2012 10:36:58 +0100 <![CDATA[Arithmetic is absolute: euro area adjustment]]> http://www.bruegel.org adjustment during 2009-11. Only Ireland, which is too small to trigger a symmetric reaction, had significantly lower inflation rates than the average. Some asymmetry is visible in total economy unit labour costs (ULC) during 2009- 11, whereas wages appear to develop more symmetrically. ULC adjustment has been largely disconnected from consumer price developments. This makes it difficult for the monetary transmission channel to operate fully and ensure consumer price adjustments. Structural reforms to remove price rigidities are key. The forecast is worrying. While the European Commission forecasts that Greek inflation rates will fall, German and Italian inflation rates will not adjust in the right direction during 2012-13. Less inflation in Italy and more inflation in Germany are urgently needed to achieve rebalancing in the euro area."]]> Wed, 23 May 2012 12:08:12 +0100 <![CDATA[How wide is the Mediterrenean?]]> http://www.bruegel.org This policy contribution provides up-to-date evidence of the strong heterogeneity in the relationships between the five biggest EU economies with the Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs). Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are still strongly tied to France, Italy and Spain, in terms of investments, financial flows and migration. This pattern is in line with the pattern of sizable French and Spanish official bilateral development assistance for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. However, the economic connection of Germany, the UK and the US to the western SMCs is negligible. German and US bilateral development assistance is focused in Egypt, while the four other SMCs appear not to be priorities for non-Mediterranean EU countries. These differences cannot be explained by geographical distance alone. The unbalanced economic relationship of the SMCs with a small number of European countries risks exposing the SMCs to shocks in partner countries. Stronger economic ties also results in a higher degree of mutual political attention, as exemplified by bilateral development assistance that flows more strongly between countries with strong economic links. EU external policy is still largely driven by member states’ interests. Hence building economic ties between the SMCs and non-traditional EU partners could both improve the SMCs’ external economic relationships, and make the SMCs’ political relationship with the EU more resilient. Bruegel gratefully acknowledges the support of the German Marshall Fund]]> Mon, 21 May 2012 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Monetary transmission in three central European economies: evidence from time-varying coefficient vector autoregressions]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 02 May 2012 14:41:09 +0100 <![CDATA[Propping up Europe?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 24 Apr 2012 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Hazardous tango: sovereign-bank interdependence and financial stability in the euro area]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 16 Apr 2012 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The messy rebuilding of Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org
  • Make room for deeper integration within the euro area, beyond the limited remit envisaged in the Lisbon treaty
  • Preserve the integrity of the EU27 and its essential governance arrangements
  • Ensure equal treatment in the application of common rules
  • Ensure that candidates for euro-area membership have a voice in the definition of its rules
  • Balance the requirements of legal clarity, accountability and efficiency with the desirability of experimentation through variable geometry
  • This paper was presented to the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers of the European Union on 30 March 2012 in Copenhagen.]]>
    Fri, 30 Mar 2012 13:20:02 +0100
    <![CDATA[Sudden stops in the euro area]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 29 Mar 2012 11:13:54 +0100 <![CDATA[Are banks affected by their holdings of government debt?]]> http://www.bruegel.org
  • Banks’ holdings of the sovereign bonds of vulnerable countries generally decreased during the period December 2010 to September 2011.
  • The average stock market performance of each country’s banks was very uneven during 2011. The long-term refinancing operation (LTRO) had no material effect on banks’ stock market values.
  • Greek debt holdings had an effect on banks’ market values in the period July to October 2011 while after October this effect disappeared. Holdings of Italian and Irish debt had a material effect on banks’ market value in the period October to December 2011. Holdings of debt of other periphery countries, in particular Spain, were not an issue. The July PSI deal did not substantially affect the risk resulting from holdings of debt other than Greek debt.
  • The location of banks matters for their market value. This highlights the need to form a banking union in the euroarea.
  • ]]>
    Mon, 26 Mar 2012 11:16:41 +0100
    <![CDATA[Real effective exchange rates for 178 countries: a new database]]> http://www.bruegel.org Click here for the most recently updated database
    The real effective exchange rate (REER), which measures the development of the real value of a country’s currency against the basket of the trading partners of the country, is a frequently used variable in both theoretical and applied economic research and policy analysis. It is used for a wide variety of purposes, such as assessing the equilibrium value of a currency, the change in price or cost competitiveness, the drivers of trade flows, or incentives for reallocation production between the tradable and the non-tradable sectors. Due to the importance of the REER in economic research and policy analysis, several institutions, such as the World Bank, the Eurostat, the BIS, the OECD, just to name a few, publish various REER indicators which are freely downloadable. Altogether, these institutions publish data for 113 countries. The countries for which data are available include all advanced and several emerging and developing countries. However, different databases may have different methodologies and even the 109 countries included in the World Bank database miss several dozen countries of the world. Our database has three novelties:
    1. Using a consistent methodology, we calculate CPI-based REER for 178 countries (plus the euro area) for annual data and for 153 countries (plus the euro area) for monthly data.
    2. We calculate the REER for all countries up to date, eg in the current vintage of the database we calculate up to January 2012.
    3. It is relatively easy to calculate REER against any arbitrary group of countries – what is needed for this is a re-scaling of the weighting matrix.
    The database will be irregularly updated.]]>
    Thu, 15 Mar 2012 15:50:56 +0000
    <![CDATA[The internationalisation path of the renminbi]]> http://www.bruegel.org As China’s economic might grows, its standing and that of its currency in the international monetary system become increasingly pressing issues. The crisis seems to have reminded the Chinese authorities of the dangers of a unipolar monetary system, and they have therefore accelerated their plans to internationalise the renminbi (RMB). The goal of this internationalisation strategy is not clear and China has not defined publicly the monetary system it aims to achieve.

    Nevertheless, there are more and more signs that the internationalisation of the RMB is progressing, notwithstanding major challenges. Conventional wisdom and the majority of the literature posits that the RMB will not succeed in its internationalisation process until China fully opens its capital and financial accounts, makes its exchange rate flexible and liberalises its financial sector. These three obstacles are real but circumventable. However, if China's internationalisation strategy follows a path that concentrates on overcoming immediate challenges in order to raise the status of the RMB to that of a second-tier world currency, the Chinese authorities will still have to undertake substantial reforms if they intend to place the RMB on a footing comparable to the dollar or the euro.

    Tue, 13 Mar 2012 12:49:28 +0000
    <![CDATA[The G20: characters in search of an author]]> http://www.bruegel.org
  • in today’s global economy (with its trade and financial market integration and its institutional architecture) a “G20-type” institution is necessary– if it didn’t exist, it should be created;
  • the G20 had its high noon moment in 2008-09 and some recalibration of expectations was inevitable, but its achievements in 2010-11 have nevertheless been disappointing;
  • to be fair there is, in detailed and technical work, more progress than there seems to be at first sight;
  • from a governance standpoint, the G20 is not an efficient forum; improvements in working methods are urgently needed;
  • more fundamentally, for the G20 to retain its role, its members need to develop a common vision of global economic problems and the way to approach them.
  • ]]>
    Tue, 13 Mar 2012 11:42:06 +0000
    <![CDATA[Challenges for the euro area and implications for Latvia]]> http://www.bruegel.org
  • The euro area faces three major challenges: (1) high private and public debt in some of its parts together with a requirement for competitiveness adjustment that in some countries has barely started; (2) weak growth outlook; (3) continued banking-sector fragility that, with sovereign stress, feeds a negative feedback loop. The euro area has agreed many significant measures to overcome these problems, including the European Stability Mechanism and the fiscal compact. The 21 February agreement on Greece removes a major source of financial instability even though it is likely that further debt reductions will be needed. Significant concerns remain, the most important of which are the slow real economic adjustment and the largely unaddressed banking-sovereign fragility. The fiscal compact raises the issue of appropriate fiscal stabilisation tools at the euro-area level.
    • Countries that will soon join the euro should actively shape the debate about the further development of the overall set-up. For Latvia, joining the euro makes sense because Latvia has kept its exchange rate fixed and has undergone internal adjustment. In its euro-area accession negotiations, Latvia should ensure that it does not participate in any of the currently ongoing financial assistance programmes.
    This Policy Contribution reproduces evidence given by Guntram B. Wolff to the Latvian parliament’s European affairs committee, 22 February 2012.]]>
    Fri, 02 Mar 2012 15:05:01 +0000
    <![CDATA[Innovation in EU merger control: walking the talk]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    The author acknowledges the excellent research assistance of Joan de Solà-Morales and Hendrik Meder, and would like to thank Lars-Hendrik Röller for discussing and commenting on earlier versions of the paper.]]>
    Wed, 29 Feb 2012 11:40:05 +0000
    <![CDATA[Corporate balance sheet adjustment: stylized facts, causes and consequences]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 06 Feb 2012 10:52:38 +0000 <![CDATA[Who's afraid of sovereign bonds?]]> http://www.bruegel.org The crisis has underlined the strong interdependence between the euro-area banking and sovereign crises. To understand the role domestic banks have played in holding sovereign debt, a breakdown of government debt by holding sectors is required.
    The data shows that at the start of the crisis, most continental euro-area countries were characterised by the large size of their banks’ portfolios of domestic government bonds, which were markedly larger than in the UK or the US. Consequently, concern about sovereign solvency was bound to have major consequences for banks.
    The structural vulnerability of euro-area countries has increased, reinforcing the sovereign/ banking crisis vicious cycle. All countries for which concerns about state solvency arose in recent years have seen a reversal in the previously steady increase of the share of government debt held by non residents. Germany, by contrast, has seen an increase in the share held by non residents.
    In the short term, these observations raise a question about the effectiveness of ECB provision of liquidity to banks as a means to alleviate the sovereign crisis. At a point when government bonds are considered risky assets, euro-area banks are faced with both balance sheet and reputational risks compared to their non-euro area counterparts, and may prove reluctant to increase this exposure further.
    In the longer term, the question is if and how euro-area regulators should set incentives to reduce banks’ heavy exposure to sovereigns. This issue should be given more attention in European policy discussions on how to strengthen the euro area.]]>
    Mon, 06 Feb 2012 09:57:39 +0000
    <![CDATA[Don’t let the euro-area crisis go east]]> http://www.bruegel.org On Thursday 2 February Chinese premier Wen Jiabao signalled intention to move towards helping the euro area extricate from its trouble and declared that China was “investigating and evaluating concrete ways in which it can, via the IMF, get more deeply involved in the European debt problem”. Why is China, and more generally Asia, taking this stance? A new paper by Jean Pisani-Ferry together with European and Asian colleagues from the Asia-Europe Economic Forum (AEEF) discusses the implications of the euro crisis for Asia, reasons for Asia-Europe cooperation in solving it, and obstacles on the way to this cooperation. ]]> Fri, 03 Feb 2012 10:23:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Cutting carbon, not the economy]]> http://www.bruegel.org The great transformation: decarbonising Europe’s energy and transport systems. The research leading to these results has received funding from the Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH). The views expressed in this publication are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of FCH.]]> Thu, 02 Feb 2012 14:01:30 +0000 <![CDATA[The great transformation: decarbonising Europe’s energy and transport systems]]> http://www.bruegel.org cannot be reversed. The technological, economic and political challenge ahead is vast. But choosing the right decarbonisaton strategy offers huge economic, environmental and societal benefits. We should not overlook this debate because of the euro crisis.]]> Thu, 02 Feb 2012 13:55:51 +0000 <![CDATA[The debt challenge in Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 31 Jan 2012 10:21:27 +0000 <![CDATA[Financial reform after the crisis: an early assessment]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 27 Jan 2012 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The Euro crisis and the new impossible trinity]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    At the core of euro-area vulnerability is an impossible trinity of strict no-monetary financing, bank-sovereign interdependence and no co-responsibility for public debt. This Policy Contribution assesses the corresponding three options for reform: a broader European Central Bank (ECB) mandate, the building of a banking federation, and fiscal union with common bonds. None will be easy.

    The least feasible option is a change to the ECB’s mandate; changing market perceptions would require the ECB to credibly commit overwhelming forces, and the ECB is simply not in a position to make such a commitment.
    The building of a banking federation, meanwhile, involves reforms that are bound to be difficult. Incremental progress is likely, but a breakthrough less so.

    This leaves fiscal union. It faces major obstacles, but a decision to move in this direction would signal to the markets and ECB a commitment to stronger Economic and Monetary Union. One possibility would be to introduce a limited, experimental scheme through which trust could be rebuilt. This Policy Contribution draws on presentations made at the XXIV Moneda y Crédito Symposium, Madrid, 3 November 2011, at the Asia-Europe Economic Forum conference in Seoul, 9 December, and at De Nederlandsche Bank in Amsterdam on 17 December. I am very grateful to Silvia Merler for excellent research assistance. I thank participants in these seminars and Bruegel colleagues for comments and criticisms.]]>
    Sun, 15 Jan 2012 10:09:26 +0000
    <![CDATA[Fiscal federalism: US history for architects of Europe's fiscal union]]> http://www.bruegel.org Ever since first the blueprints for monetary union in Europe were drawn up, the United States, considered as a collection of individual states or regions, has served as a benchmark for assessing its feasibility and evaluating alternative policy options. Starting with Robert Mundell’s seminal 1961 article on optimal currency areas, countless papers have explored the inner workings of US labour, product and capital markets, and of its public finances, in the hope of learning lessons for Europe.

    It could be argued that this US inspiration is mistaken. After all, it is not the only economic and monetary federation in the world. Other federations work on different principles – especially when it comes to public finances – and there is no guarantee that US arrangements are optimal – especially, again, regarding public finances. But we know the US better and we think we understand it better, so success or failure relative to the US test carries much more weight than with the Australian, Canadian, Indian or Swiss tests. For better or worse, the US remains our ultimate policy laboratory.

    This essay on US fiscal federalism by Randall Henning and Martin Kessler builds on the established tradition. But unlike many papers that take current US features as a given, they tell us what present arrangements governing responsibility over public debt gradually emerged from, and why. By bringing in the historical dimension and the trial-and-error process that took place over more than two centuries, they help us understand the logic behind alternative arrangements and why the current one has in the end prevailed.

    Their careful historical account yields several important lessons. It first recalls that the US system as we know it, with its combination of a large federal budget responsible for the bulk of public debt and limited thrifty state budgets subject to balanced budget rules, emerged gradually from a sequence of events; in fact the initial set-up, as designed and enforced by Alexander Hamilton, was almost exactly the opposite.

    Second, it makes clear that beyond economic principles, attitudes towards what was in the aftermath of independence called the ‘assumption’ of state debt were shaped by broader political considerations – not least the aim of building a genuine federal government.

    Third, it explains how after the US was firmly established as a federation, changing political conditions led to a reversal of the federal government’s stance and to the enforcement of a ‘no bail-out’ principle.

    An intriguing feature of US history is therefore that the competences and features of federal government grew out of its assumption of state debt, and that the centre imposed a de-facto no bail-out regime only after having assumed essential powers.

    Another interesting observation by Henning and Kessler is that balanced budget rules were adopted spontaneously by states in response to financial stress and defaults, rather than as a disciplinary device mandated by the centre. Thus, there is still significant variability between states regarding the modus operandi and strictness of budget rules. The question remains if what matters is the strictness of the rule, or deeper political preferences at state level, of which the rule is only an expression.

    Finally, Henning and Kessler emphasise, a no less important lesson for Europe is that policy principles and institutions should be looked at as a system rather than in isolation. As the authors point out, it may seem obvious to recall that states in the US can abide by strict budget balance
    rules to the extent the federal government is responsible for stabilisation and the bail-out of insolvent banks, but this simple lesson is sometimes overlooked in European discussion.

    Jean Pisani-Ferry

    Director of Bruegel

    Tue, 10 Jan 2012 15:24:15 +0000
    <![CDATA[Assessing the potential for knowledge-based development in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Society and Economy Volume 33, Number 3/December 2011]]> Mon, 09 Jan 2012 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Financial transaction tax: Small is beautiful]]> http://www.bruegel.org Society and Economy Volume 33, Number 3/December 2011 A revised version of this paper was published as a Bruegel Policy Contribution in February 2010. Please see here to download the Policy Contribution.]]> Mon, 09 Jan 2012 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[A tale of three countries: recovery after banking crises]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 29 Dec 2011 16:04:58 +0000 <![CDATA[Still standing: how European firms weathered the crisis - The third EFIGE policy report]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 22 Dec 2011 18:58:32 +0000 <![CDATA[Mind Europe's early-stage equity gap]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 19 Dec 2011 14:41:04 +0000 <![CDATA[Rating agencies and sovereign credit risk assessment]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 15 Dec 2011 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The group of G20: Trials of global governance in times of crisis]]> http://www.bruegel.org G20 Monitor.]]> Wed, 07 Dec 2011 09:36:51 +0000 <![CDATA[What kind of fiscal union?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 23 Nov 2011 12:49:40 +0000 <![CDATA[Assessing competitiveness: how firm-level data can help]]> http://www.bruegel.org www.efige.org), a project to help identify the internal policies needed to improve the external competitiveness of the European Union. ]]> Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:27:28 +0000 <![CDATA[The international monetary system is changing: what opportunities and risks for the euro?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 02 Nov 2011 11:11:03 +0000 <![CDATA[Wanted: a stronger and better G20 for the global economy]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 31 Oct 2011 17:02:23 +0000 <![CDATA[Rate expectations: what can and cannot be done about rating agencies]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 31 Oct 2011 10:22:03 +0000 <![CDATA[An evaluation of IMF surveillance of the euro area]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 31 Oct 2011 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Europe's growth emergency]]> http://www.bruegel.org There is a negative feedback loop between the crisis and growth, and without effective solutions to overturn the crisis, growth is unlikely to resume. National and EU level policies should aim to foster reforms and adjustment and should not risk medium term objectives under the pressure of events. A more hands-on approach, including industrial policies, should be considered. Earlier versions of this Policy Contribution were presented at the Bruegel-PIIE conference on Transatlantic economic challenges in an era of growing multipolarity, Berlin, 27 September 2011, and at the BEPA-Polish Presidency conference on Sources of growth in Europe, Brussels, 6 October 2011.]]> Fri, 21 Oct 2011 16:41:52 +0100 <![CDATA[Is recent bank stress really driven by the sovereign debt crisis?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Stress in the interbank market has increased dramatically since July and bank stock market valuation has fallen by 22 percent on average for 60 of the most important banks tested in the EBA stress tests. I find evidence that bank stock valuation is significantly and economically meaningfully affected by the bank’s exposure to Greek debt. Greek banks are particularly affected. Holdings of debt of the other four periphery countries does not however appear to be a strong determinant of stock price movements. Policy announcements of 21 July of no haircut on any sovereign but Greece appear to be perceived as credible. The exposure to Greece cannot explain the general and large decline in euro area banks’ market cap. Instead, a general confidence crisis of the euro area banking system, or more deeply the euro area construction, might be driving the fall in stock prices. The summit of 23 October should focus on restoring confidence in euro-area policymakers’ ability and determination to put the euro area on a sound footing. Recapitalisation of banks can only be only one aspect. A credible solution to Greece and a way forward for the larger institutional set-up, including a federal fiscal back-stop of the banking system, are of at least equal importance.]]> Thu, 20 Oct 2011 13:01:03 +0100 <![CDATA[Rules and risk in the euro area]]> http://www.bruegel.org Anna Iara and Guntram Wolff develop a model of sovereign spreads that are determined by the probability of default in interaction with the level of risk aversion. Estimation of the model confirms the central predictions. The legal basis for the rules, and mechanisms for enforcing them, are the most important dimensions of rulesbased fiscal governance.]]> Tue, 04 Oct 2011 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Testimony on the European debt and financial crisis]]> http://www.bruegel.org This Policy Contribution reproduces the written statement prepared by the author for the hearing "The European debt and financial crisis: origins, options and implications for the US and global economy" presented at the Subcommittee on Security and International Trade and Finance of the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,and Urban Affairs, on 22 September 2011. Europe’s banking system has been in a state of systemic fragility since 2007-08. The current phase is marked by a sequence of interactions between sovereign problems and banking problems, resulting in gradual contagion to more countriesand more asset classes. The banking and sovereign crises are compounded by a crisis of the European Union institutions. Successful crisis resolution will need to include at least four components at the European level, in addition to steps to be taken by individual countries: fiscal federalism; banking federalism; a profound overhaul of EU/euro-area institutions; and short-term arrangements that chart a path towards the completion of the previous three points. These requirements for crisis resolution cannot be met unless political conditions change sharply in their favour, which leaves the United States and the global economyexposed to the risk of financial contagion. However, only the Europeans themselves can solve their current predicament. ]]> Fri, 23 Sep 2011 10:06:42 +0100 <![CDATA[How effective and legitimate is the European semester? Increasing role of the European parliament]]> http://www.bruegel.org The European Semester is a new institutional process that provides EU member states with ex-ante guidance on fiscal and structural objectives. The Semester’s goals are ambitious and it is still uncertain how it will fit into the new EU economic governance framework. We find that member states are only slowly internalising the new procedure. Furthermore, the Semester has so far lacked legitimacy due to the minor role assigned to the European Parliament, the marginal involvement of national parliaments and the lack of transparency of the process at some stages. Finally, there remains room to clarify the implications from a unified legal text. In fact, diluting the legal separation of recommendations on National Reform Programmes and Council opinions on Stability and Convergence Programmes may compromise effective surveillance and governance. The European Parliament has an important role to play. It needs hold the Commission and the Council accountable. This and the overall objective of enhancing the new procedure’s effectiveness and legitimacy can be done by means of a regular Economic Dialogue on the Semester.]]> Thu, 22 Sep 2011 12:24:15 +0100 <![CDATA[Rethinking central banking]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 13 Sep 2011 10:22:25 +0100 <![CDATA[Changing of the guard - Challenges ahead for the new ECB president]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    First, trust of citizens in the ECB has fallenmassively according to the Eurobarometer survey inmany euro area countries, including Germany and Greece. Trust needs to be regained. Second, the ECB’s stance on Greece needs to be reversed both as regards financial sector participation and SMP. The SMP for Italy can be justified but can only be a temporary solution. The ECB will therefore have to further push for a fiscal lender-of-last-resort back-stop that can also exercise conditionality.

    Third, a rate cut should be considered at this point in time but upcoming political pressure to increase inflation needs to be resisted.]]>
    Mon, 12 Sep 2011 11:09:08 +0100
    <![CDATA[How effective and legitimate is the European Semester? Increasing the role of the European Parliament]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 08 Sep 2011 09:33:44 +0100 <![CDATA[Identifying Discretionary Fiscal Policy Reactions with Real-Time Data]]> http://www.bruegel.org Guntram Wolff co-authored with Ulf von Kalckreuth a paper published on the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. Go to the publication In this paper, the authors propose a method of identifying discretionary fiscal policy reactions using real-time data. Automatic stabilizers should depend on true GDP, while discretionary fiscal policy is contingent on the information that policy makers have in real time. We can compute a real-time measurement error by comparing the first release of GDP data with later revisions.

    Discretionary fiscal policy is influenced by this measurement error, whereas automatic fiscal policy is not. The authors use this identification approach to test the central identifying assumption of Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) seminal structural vector autoregression (VAR). According to this assumption, fiscal policy makers do not react to GDP developments contemporaneously in a discretionary fashion. This analysis finds that government expenditure is adjusted upward if GDP growth in real time is lower than true GDP. This suggests that fiscal policy makers use short-term funds to buy goods and services in response to their perception of GDP dynamics.]]>
    Tue, 16 Aug 2011 00:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[Economic governance and varieties of capitalism]]> http://www.bruegel.org Europe Today. Click here to view a description of the book. The author's research describes the structure and evolution of European economic governance using a varieties-of-capitalism approach. It accounts for the constant tention between the devolution of sovereignty to the EU and the preservation of national specificities regarding product, labour, financial markets and aggregate demand regimes.]]> Thu, 04 Aug 2011 11:50:52 +0100 <![CDATA[Global currencies for tomorrow: a European perspective ]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system forty years ago, the IMS gradually developed into its present state, a hybrid mix of exchange-rate flexibility, capital mobility and monetary independence. The US dollar retains a dominant, but not exclusive, role and the IMS governance system blends regional and multilateral surveillance. It combines IMF-based and ad-hoc liquidity provision. Although it has proved resilient during the crisis, partly thanks to ad-hoc arrangements, the IMS has serious flaws, which are likely to be magnified by the rapid transformation of the global economy and the increasing economic power of emerging economies.]]>
    Sat, 23 Jul 2011 00:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[The global operations of European firms - The second EFIGE policy report]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 21 Jul 2011 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[An action plan for the European leaders]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 20 Jul 2011 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Assessing the impact of the EU ETS using firm level data]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 15 Jul 2011 14:26:57 +0100 <![CDATA[Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European Countries]]> http://www.bruegel.org OECD Journal on Budgeting ]]> Fri, 15 Jul 2011 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Eastern European lessons for the southern Mediterranean]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 14 Jul 2011 14:34:41 +0100 <![CDATA[Dodd Frank: One year on]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    This publication was edited by Viral Acharya, Thomas F Cooley, Matthew Richardson and Ingo Walter. Including contributions from Michael Barr, Thomas Cooley, Martin Baily, Patrick Parkinson, Kermit Schoenholtz, Vincent Reinhart, J Nellie Liang, Thomas Hoenig, Viral Acharya, Matthew Richardson, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Lawrence J. White, Tobias Adrian, Neil Barofsky, and Nicolas Véron]]>
    Tue, 12 Jul 2011 00:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[Keeping the promise of global accounting standards]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 07 Jul 2011 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Das Blue Bond-Konzept und seine Implikationen]]> http://www.bruegel.org The Blue Bond proposal" published in May 2010, and on the policy contribution "Eurobonds: The blue bond concept and its implications" published in March 2011 ]]> Fri, 24 Jun 2011 12:34:20 +0100 <![CDATA[Debt restructuring in the euro area: A necessary but manageable evil? ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 21 Jun 2011 15:19:38 +0100 <![CDATA[Rethinking industrial policy]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 16 Jun 2011 10:30:25 +0100 <![CDATA[TGAE report - The contribution of 16 European think tanks to the Polish, Danish, and Cypriot trio presidency of the European Union]]> http://www.bruegel.org Notre Europe, this report focuses on the medium-term, covering the Polish, Danish and Cypriot Trio Presidency, which will run from July 2011 to December 2012. Such a focus allows for an in-depth analysis of the Trio’s role, both front-stage and back-stage, as it develops in the context of the Lisbon Treaty’s implementation. Accordingly, the authors of this report, coming from 16 European think tanks, take stock of the initiatives adopted during the past Trio Presidency, identify emerging challenges and formulate concrete short- to medium-term proposals aiming for rapid policy-progress. Overall, the 18-month time frame to which each new edition of TGAE is devoted produces, from one report to the next, a comprehensive chronological picture of the EU’s development.]]> Wed, 15 Jun 2011 16:49:07 +0100 <![CDATA[Exchange Rate Policy and Economic Growth after the Financial Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Eurasian Geography and Economics on the influence of exchange rate policies on the region's recovery. The author argues that post-crisis corrections in current account deficits in CEE countries do not in themselves signal a return to steady economic growth. Disagreeing with Åslund over the role of loose monetary policy in fostering the region's economic problems, he outlines a number of competitiveness problems that remain to be addressed in the 10 new EU member states of CEE, along with improvements in framework conditions supporting future macroeconomic growth. Click here to download this paper ]]> Fri, 10 Jun 2011 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Europe's clean technology investment challenge]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 08 Jun 2011 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Green exports and the global product space: Prospects for EU industrial policy]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sun, 22 May 2011 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The Euro area's macroeconomic balancing act]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 18 May 2011 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Suggestions for reforming the governance of global accounting standards]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 12 May 2011 12:50:20 +0100 <![CDATA[Heterogeneity in money holdings across euro area countries: the role of housing]]> http://www.bruegel.org Guntram B. Wolff (co-authored with Paulvan den Noord and Ralph Setzer) has just been published by the European Journal of Political Economy. Click here to download the paper This paper studies why monetary aggregates of euro area Member States have developed differently since the inception of the euro. A money demand equation that incorporates housing wealth and collateral as well as substitution effects on real money holdings. Empirically, it is shown that cross-country differences in real balances are determined not only by income differences, a standard determinant of money demand, but also by house price developments. Higher house prices and higher user costs of housing are both associated with larger money holdings. Country-specific money holdings are also connected with structural features of the housing market. ]]> Wed, 04 May 2011 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[A G2 for science?]]> http://www.bruegel.org are to deliver long-term international competitiveness.]]> Sun, 03 Apr 2011 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[What international monetary system for a fast-changing world economy]]> http://www.bruegel.org Which of these alternatives will materialise depends on the degree of cooperation within a multilateral framework.]]> Sat, 02 Apr 2011 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[ Reform of the international monetary system: Some concrete steps]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 28 Mar 2011 13:34:37 +0100 <![CDATA[Eurobonds: The blue bond concept and its implications]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 21 Mar 2011 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[An ocean apart: Comparing transatlantic responses to the financial crisis]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sat, 12 Mar 2011 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[A comprehensive approach to the euro-area crisis: Background calculations]]> http://www.bruegel.org Zsolt Darvas, Jean Pisani-Ferry and André Sapir "A comprehensive approach to the euro-area debt crisis", Bruegel Policy Brief No 2011/02, February 2011. An assessment of the results and policy conclusions can be found in the Policy Brief.]]> Thu, 24 Feb 2011 10:14:23 +0000 <![CDATA[From convoy to parting ways? Post-crisis divergence between European and US macroeconomic Policies]]> http://www.bruegel.org In response to this situation this working paper suggests a critical quantum of coordination. Key measures include a commitment to avoiding deliberate currency depreciation and unilateral intervention; agreement to give the IMF an enhanced monitoring role; the adoption by parliaments of medium-term fiscal plans ; and cooperation on the issue of Chinese undervaluation. ]]> Tue, 15 Feb 2011 18:19:04 +0000 <![CDATA[A European fund for economic revival in crisis countries]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 09 Feb 2011 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[A comprehensive approach to the euro-area debt crisis]]> http://www.bruegel.org Zsolt Darvas, André Sapir and Jean Pisani-Ferry, propose a comprehensive solution to the current European crisis based in three pillars: a plan to restore banking sector soundness, a resolution of sovereign debt crisis including a reduction of the Greek public debt and a strategy to foster growth and competitiveness. The paper provides novel estimates and analysis focusing on the current situation of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Bruegel produced a video of the authors Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir and Zsolt Darvas commenting on the "A comprehensive approach to the euro area debt crisis".
    Watch the video
    Mon, 07 Feb 2011 00:00:00 +0000
    <![CDATA[Too big to fail: the transatlantic debate]]> http://www.bruegel.org Nicolas Véron and Morris Goldstein examines the debates on the problem posed by "too big to fail" financial institutions. The authors then turn to possible remedies and how they may be differentially implemented in America and Europe. They conclude on the policy developments that are likely in the near future.]]> Sat, 05 Feb 2011 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The fiscal and monetary institutions of CESEE countries]]> http://www.bruegel.org OECD Journal on Budgeting]]> Fri, 04 Feb 2011 15:04:38 +0000 <![CDATA[Is European climate policy the new CAP?]]> http://www.bruegel.org In its third phase (2013-20) the European Union's emissions trading system (ETS) will issue allowances for around two billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent each year. The emission rights are valued at around €30-35 billion at current prices, between one-half and two-thirds of the amount the EU spends on the Common Agricultural Policy. The redistributive effects of the allocation of emission allowances are therefore potentially significant. Quantitative indicators for the relative degree to which individual countries will be affected by the ETS suggest that economic consequences for the member states will be quite different. In this policy brief, Georg Zachmann finds that countries with less favourable initial conditions are eventually largely compensated. Click here here  to download the ETS indicators by country Bruegel also produced a video of the author Georg Zachmann commenting on the findings of his policy brief.
    Watch the video
    Thu, 27 Jan 2011 15:46:13 +0000
    <![CDATA[Corporate governance practices and companies' R&D orientation: evidence from European countries.]]> http://www.bruegel.org Bruno van Pottelsberghe found that an executive remuneration system that is linked to the firm's financial performance has a particularly strong negative impact on R&D. This confirms the hypothesis that incentive mechanisms lead managers to focus on more predictable and easily measurable short-term activities,ultimately hampering the commitment to innovative projects.]]> Mon, 24 Jan 2011 14:45:34 +0000 <![CDATA[Beyond the crisis: prospects for emerging Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Zsolt Darvas assesses the impact of the 2008-09 global financial and economic crisis on the medium-term growth prospects of CEES countries, the Caucasus and Central Asia, which starting their economic transition about twenty years ago. Evidence shows that the crisis has had a major impact on the within-sample fit of the models used and that the positive impact of EU enlargement on growth is smaller than previous research has shown. The crisis has also altered the future growth prospects of the countries studied, even in the optimistic but unrealistic case of a return to pre-crisis capital inflows and credit booms. A version of this publication was also released as an article for Comparative Economic Studies (2011) 53, 261–290; published online 28 April 2011]]> Tue, 04 Jan 2011 17:41:17 +0000 <![CDATA[The case for reforming euro area entry criteria]]> http://www.bruegel.org click here. To download the working paper version, click here.]]> Wed, 15 Dec 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The threat of 'currency wars': a European perspective]]> http://www.bruegel.org he threat of currency wars: global imbalances and their effect on currencies, held on 30 November 2010. Bruegel Fellows Jean Pisani-Ferry and Zsolt Darvas argue the so-called currency war is manifested in three ways: 1) the inflexible pegs of undervalued currencies; 2) attempts by floating exchange-rate countries to resist currency appreciation; 3) quantitative easing. Europe should primarily be concerned about the first issue, which relates to the renewed debate about the international monetary system. The attempts of floating exchange-rate countries to resist currency appreciation are generally justified while China retains a peg. Quantitative easing cannot be deemed a "beggar-thy-neighbour" policy as long as the Fed's policy is geared towards price stability. Central banks should come to an agreement about the definition of price stability at a time of deflationary pressures, as current US inflationary expectations are at historically low levels. Finally, the exchange rate of the Euro has not been greatly impacted by the recent currency war; the euro continues to be overvalued, but less than before.]]> Mon, 13 Dec 2010 16:52:20 +0000 <![CDATA[EU financial regulatory reform: a status report]]> http://www.bruegel.org Nicolas Véron argues that the EU regulatory response to the crisis has been generally slower in the EU than in the United States, for four main reasons: swifter financial crisis management and resolution in the US; structural differences in legislative processes; the EU’s front-loading of institutional reform, most notably the creation of European Supervisory Authorities; and the timetable of renewal of the European Commission in 2009-10. The EU has nevertheless initiated or completed significant regulatory initiatives in terms of banking, market structures, private equity and hedge funds, rating agencies and accounting. However, major further challenges loom. ]]> Thu, 09 Dec 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The threat of "currency wars"]]> http://www.bruegel.org Jean Pisani-Ferry and Zsolt Darvas argue that the ‘currency war’ has three manifestations: 1. currency pegs, 2. recent attempts by floating exchange rate countries to resist currency appreciation and 3. quantitative easing. Europe should primarily be concerned about the first issue, which is related to the renewed debate on the international monetary system.]]> Tue, 30 Nov 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Whither growth in central and eastern Europe? Policy lessons for an integrated Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Zsolt Darvas, Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir and their co-authors Torbjörn Becker, Daniel Daianu, Vladimir Gligorov, Michael A Landesmann, Pavle Petrovic, Dariusz K. Rosati and Beatrice Weder di Mauro argue that in view of the depth of integration in Europe, the development model of the central, eastern and south-eastern Europe (CESEE) region, despite its shortcomings, should be preserved. But it should be reformed, with major implications for policymaking both at national and EU levels. If so, what are the required changes? Bruegel and The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) cooperated to form this expert group of economists from various European countries to research these issues. ]]> Wed, 24 Nov 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Facts and lessons from euro area divergences for enlargement]]> http://www.bruegel.org "The Euro And Economic Stability: Focus on Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe". Click here for more information on the publication and list of contents.]]> Thu, 18 Nov 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[A European mechanism for sovereign debt crisis resolution: a proposal]]> http://www.bruegel.org Francois Gianviti, Anne O. Krueger, Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir and Jürgen von Hagen, present the rationale for such a mechanism in the euro area and details of how an ECRM would work. The ECRM would be a permanent tool to deal with sovereign debt crises in an effective and predictable way.]]> Tue, 09 Nov 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The unequal effect of new banking rules in Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Benedicta Marzinotto and Jörg Rocholl focus on the tightening of credit conditions for banking rules (Basel III), particularly the estimated macroeconomic costs range, monetary policy and the aggregate costs of the measures. The authors report that the monetary policy response to these changes is not likely to be accommodating and that the aggregate costs of the measures will be differently distributed across countries depending on a variety of issues.]]> Fri, 22 Oct 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Reform of the Global Financial Architecture]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 19 Oct 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Young leading innovators and EUÂ’s R&D intensity gap]]> http://www.bruegel.org Reinhilde Veugelers and Michele Cincera give evidence to show that compared to the US, the EU has fewer young firms among its leading innovators and the primary driver of this private R&D gap is due to the fact that young leading innovators in the EU are less R&D intensive than their US counterparts. This paper complements the Bruegel policy brief, Europe’s missing yollies.]]> Thu, 30 Sep 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[An assessment of the G20's initial action items]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 10 Sep 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Monitoring Macroeconomic Imbalances in Europe: Proposal for a Refined Analytical Framework]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 08 Sep 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The relationship between health and growth: when Lucas meets Nelson-Phelps]]> http://www.bruegel.org Philippe Aghion combines the Lucas and Nelson-Phelps approaches to human capital to give us a better understanding of the relationship between health and growth.]]> Mon, 06 Sep 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Not all financial regulation is global]]> http://www.bruegel.org Nicolas Véron and Stéphane Rottier, National Bank of Belgium, explain why now is the time to focus on building stronger global public institutions, ensuring globally consistent financial information, creating globally integrated capital-markets infrastructure and addressing competitive distortions among global capital-market intermediaries to set the foundation for global harmonisation of all aspects of financial regulation.]]> Tue, 31 Aug 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Europe's missing yollies]]> http://www.bruegel.org Reinhilde Veugelers and Michele Cincera, Professor at ULB, draw our attention to young leading innovators ('yollies'). They explain why the European Union's business research and development deficit, relative to the United States, can be attributed to the EU having fewer yollies, especially those that are less R&D intensive. This paper raises important and timely questions about the EU's innovation policy. The authors argue why policy makers should pay attention to the heterogeneity across young sectors and design sector-specific measures to boost innovation and growth in the EU.]]> Wed, 25 Aug 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The quality factor in patent systems]]> http://www.bruegel.org Bruno van Pottelsberghe develops a methodology to compare the quality of examination services in different patent offices. Quality is defined as the extent to which patent offices comply with their patentability conditions in a transparent way. The methodology consists of a two-layer analytical framework encompassing 'legal standards' and their 'operational design', which includes several interdependent components that affect the stringency and transparency of the filtering process.]]> Tue, 13 Jul 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Fiscal federalism in crisis: lessons for Europe from the US]]> http://www.bruegel.org Zsolt Darvas answers three questions in this Policy Contribution- Why has the euro been hit so hard? How would a more federal European fiscal union closer to the US model have helped? How do the euro area’s fiscal architecture reform plans stand up in light of the US example? He concludes that a higher level of fiscal federation is not inevitable for the viability of the euro area, but current European fiscal reform proposals carry political risk and their implementation could be deficient or lack credibility. Introduction of a Eurobond covering up to 60 percent of member states’ GDP would be a much more preferable solution.]]> Mon, 12 Jul 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The opening up of eastern Europe at 20-jobs, skills, and ‘reverse maquiladorasÂ’ in Austria and Germany]]> http://www.bruegel.org To address these questions, this paper makes use of new survey data of 660 German and Austrian firms with 2,200 investment projects in eastern Europe during the period 1990-2001. The new survey data represent 100 percent of Austrian and 80 percent of German direct investment in eastern Europe.]]> Mon, 12 Jul 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Why Germany fell out of love with Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 01 Jul 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Boosting innovation in Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mathias Dewatripont, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management; Bruno van Pottelsberghe and André Sapir, Senior Fellows at Bruegel and professors at ULB; and Reinhilde Veugelers, senior fellow at Bruegel and professor at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, makes suggestions based on three principles: to give primacy to merit-based selection of projects at the European level, to strengthen the single market to make it conducive for research and innovation and to remove barriers that hinder dynamic restructuring. This paper is addressed to the July 2010 informal Competitiveness Council (Research) under the Belgian Presidency. ]]> Mon, 28 Jun 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The global operations of European firms]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 18 Jun 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Euro area governance: What went wrong in the euro area? How to repair it?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Jean Pisani-Ferry focuses on the institutional response to the euro area crisis with the Van Rompuy Task Force being set up to reform economic governance. The task force is due to present its progress report shortly and the author examines two basic questions in this context– what went wrong in the euro area (and the lessons learnt from this) and consequently what are the three choices for reforming governance. He explains why implementation of existing rules need to be strengthened and why the Van Rompuy Task Force should revisit the fundamental principles on which the EMU is founded and resist the temptation to solely address divergences. ]]> Tue, 08 Jun 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Euro Area Governance: What went wrong? How to repair it?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 08 Jun 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Power to the people of Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 07 Jun 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Assessing the potential for knowledge-based development in transition countries ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Reinhilde Veugelers examines the potential for a knowledge-based growth path in transition countries of central and eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The paper looks closely at how total-factor productivity, a residual growth factor commonly interpreted as reflecting technological progress, drives growth rates in these economies which exhibit a much lower GDP per capita compared to the EU15 or the United States.  By analysing the prerequisites for knowledge-based growth, the author explains why transition countries are at a systemic disadvantage relative to the EU15, US and Japan and have limited potential for knowledge-based growth. ]]> Mon, 31 May 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The role of state aid control in improving bank resolution in Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org André Sapir, Mathias Dewatripont, ULB and CEPR; Gregory Nguyen, National Bank of Belgium, and Peter Praet, National Bank of Belgium, show how in the short-term, the European Commission, through its state aid control discipline, can set the foundation for a new crisis resolution architecture. It can act as a substitute to improve coordination among member states and complement a European resolution authority once it is set up.]]> Mon, 17 May 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The Blue Bond Proposal]]> http://www.bruegel.org Jakob von Weizsäcker and Jacques Delpla from Conseil d'Analyse Économique, Paris, explain the economics behind their proposal, its institutional underpinnings and the implication of it on various participating countries.

    Thu, 06 May 2010 00:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[Europe should stop taxing innovation]]> http://www.bruegel.org Bruno van Pottelsberghe makes the argument in favour of a single EU patent system. The author explains that the absence of a one-stop-shop for EU-wide patents hampers innovation and will pose serious challenges to small and medium-sized companies in the face of global competition. This paper analyses how a uniform patent system can sustain long-term competitiveness and boost growth and thereby achieve EU2020 targets. It makes policy recommendations in four key areas of a single patent system - language, complexity, affordability and governance.    ]]> Tue, 30 Mar 2010 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Two crises, two responses]]> http://www.bruegel.org Jean Pisani-Ferry, Senior Fellow André Sapir and Resident Fellow Benedicta Marzinotto emphasises the need for a more nuanced understanding of the different kinds of crises affecting euro members. Using Spain and Greece as examples, this paper makes policy recommendations for both scenarios. It explains how budgetary surveillance can be strengthened to prevent crises. It says the scope of Article 143 of the Lisbon Treaty should be extended and a clear and predictable conditional assistance regime put in place for effective crises management in the euro area.]]> Mon, 22 Mar 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Future developments of global imbalances ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Jean Pisani-Ferryand Research Fellow Zsolt Darvas examine the role of global imbalances to the crisis and explain how changes in the international monetary system can mitigate global imbalances. This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.]]> Mon, 15 Mar 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[China and the world economy: a European perspective]]> http://www.bruegel.org Jean Pisani-Ferry discusses the emergence of China as a key economic and global player from a European perspective. Looking ahead, this paper focuses on two key aspects, the rebalancing of global growth and the strengthening of global governance, and explains how these will shape Sino-European economic relations. The author argues that now is the time for high-quality dialogue between policymakers from both sides. China and the European Union must overcome their institutional differences to pave the way for fruitful economic cooperation. ]]> Fri, 12 Mar 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Think Global Act European II]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 04 Mar 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Monetary Policy and Risk Taking]]> http://www.bruegel.org In this paper Bruegel Visiting Scholar Ignazio Angeloni (European Central Bank), Ester Faia (Goethe University Frankfurt, Kiel IfW and CEPREMAP)  and Marco Lo Duca (European Central Bank) examine the links between monetary policy, financial risk and the business cycle, combining data evidence and a new DSGE model with banks. The model includes banks (modeled as in Diamond and Rajan, JF 2000 and JPE 2001) and a financial accelerator (Bernanke et al., 1999 Handbook). A monetary expansion increases the propensity of banks to assume risks. In turn, financial risks affect economic activity and prices. This "risk-taking" channel of monetary transmission, absent in pure financial accelerator models, operates via the leverage decisions of banks. The model results match certain features of the data, as emerged in recent panel data studies and in our own time series estimates for the US and the euro area. ]]> Mon, 15 Feb 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Financial-Transaction Tax: Small Is Beautiful]]> http://www.bruegel.org Society and Economy Volume 33, Number 3/December 2011]]> Mon, 08 Feb 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Crisis resolution in the euro area: an alternative to the European Monetray Fund ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 01 Feb 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Memo to the New Digital Agenda Commissioner]]> http://www.bruegel.org Reinhilde Veugelers and Bruno van Pottelsberghe provide recommendations for the term of new Digital Agenda Commissioner Neelie Kroes in this supplement to Bruegel's Memos to the New Commission: Europe's Economic Priorities 2010-2015. They argue that Kroes should move past a focus on infrastructure and concentrate more on ICT's potential to contribute to growth in the European Union. This should include a focus on emerging ICT products and services to helpl foster an ICT single market and more public support for R&D and innovation, through tailored programmes designed to aid high-risk innovative projects conceived by new ICT companies.]]> Mon, 25 Jan 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Financial Transaction Tax: Small is Beautiful]]> http://www.bruegel.org here for the authors' accompanying presentation. A revised version of this paper was published as a Bruegel Policy Contribution in February 2010. Please see here to download the Policy Contribution. ]]> Mon, 11 Jan 2010 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The EU's Role in Supporting Crisis-Hit Countries in Central and Eastern Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 31 Dec 2009 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Memo to the new Commissioner for Energy]]> http://www.bruegel.org ]]> Wed, 30 Dec 2009 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Cost Benefit Analysis of the Community Patent]]> http://www.bruegel.org Bruno van Pottelsberghe and Jérôme Danguy use simulations to take a look at the advantages, disadvantages, winners and losers from the creation of the COMPAT. They find that it would drastically reduce the relative patenting costs for applicants while generating more income for the European Patent Office and increased savings for the business sector. They also explain that the lost of economic rents for patent attorneys, translators and lawyers specialised in patent litigation and the drop of controlling power for national patent offices may explain why there has been such resistance to the COMPAT thus far.]]> Wed, 23 Dec 2009 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Monetary Policy on the Way Out of the Crisis]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 17 Dec 2009 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Banking Crisis Management in the EU: An Interim Assessment]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 09 Dec 2009 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[IFRS Sustainability Requires Further Governance Reform]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 09 Dec 2009 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The Crisis: Policy Lessons and Policy Challenges]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 02 Dec 2009 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Monetary Policy on the Way out of the Crisis]]> http://www.bruegel.org In this paper, commissioned by the European Parliament, Bruegel Visiting Scholar, Juergen von Hagen analyses the European and US monetary strategies during the crisis and points out that at the current moment coordination of monetary and fiscal exit strategies will be essential in order to avoid killing off the recovery before it has acquired full force. The author suggests that the risks of adverse macroeconomic developments are considerably less if fiscal policy exists from crisis mode first and monetary policy second.]]> Tue, 01 Dec 2009 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The Baltic Challenge and Euro-Area Entry]]> http://www.bruegel.org Zsolt Darvas takes a look at the issue of the Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - and the challenges facing those three countries in the aftermath of the financial crisis. He argues that because it is in the broader European interest to prevent a collapse in the Baltics, the best option is immediate euro entry at a suitable exchange rate supported by appropriate resolution in order to manage the resulting debt overhang. However, there seems to be no legal basis for this under the current euro accession criteria. Furthermore, the economic foundations of the criteria are fundamentally flawed, as euro-area members continue to violate the criteria while the EU's expansion to 27 members has made the criteria tougher for new member states to meet themselves. Ultimately, the European Council has the ability to reform the criteria without a formal treaty change. The Council should do so, the author argues, and allow for more meaningful benchmarks for all future euro-area applicants.]]> Mon, 30 Nov 2009 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[No Green Growth Without Innovation]]> http://www.bruegel.org Philippe Aghion, Senior Resident Fellow Reinhilde Veugelers and David Hemous of Harvard University, attempts to change the terms of the debate surrounding climate change policy. The authors argue that policymakers should do more to encourage innovation and investment in ‘green’ research and development rather than focusing solely on the setting of a carbon price. Using a model developed by Aghion in a previous paper, they argue that a carbon price would have to be about 15 times higher in the first five years and 12 times higher in the next five years if innovation is not properly subsidized by governments. The authors also provide several policy recommendations for incentivising this type of ‘green growth’ in the private sector.]]> Mon, 23 Nov 2009 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Cold Start for the Green Innovation Machine]]> http://www.bruegel.org “No Green Growth Without Innovation”. Written by Senior Non-Resident Fellow Philippe Aghion, Senior Resident Fellow Reinhilde Veugelers and Researcher Clément Serre, this paper discusses the state of green innovation and goes into more depth in discussing the current problems in the area. Examining research and development, patent, and venture capital data, the authors point out that there is momentum for private investment in green technologies. However, they argue that, thus far, the implicit tax rate on energy in the EU27 is too low and fragmented, the carbon price in the EU Emissions Trading System is too volatile, and the public R&D expenditures dedicated to energy and environment are too low. They conclude that immediate state intervention is necessary, at least at the onset, to ensure that the ‘green innovation machine’ gets properly started.]]> Mon, 23 Nov 2009 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[More Than One Step to Financial Stability]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 28 Oct 2009 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[A European Exit Strategy]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 14 Oct 2009 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Can A Less Boring ECB Remain Accountable?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Monetary Dialogue with the European Central Bank meeting on 28 September. In this briefing paper for the Panel, Director Jean Pisani-Ferry and Resident Fellow Jakob von Weizsäcker point out that, in the wake of the financial crisis, the ECB will take on much more responsibility for macro-prudential supervision of the financial system. With this added responsibility, however, comes serious questions about the mechanisms in place to ensure the ECB's accountability. Previously focused almost solely on price stability, the ECB will now likely be asked to increase its discretionary decision-making, especially in dealing with financial regulation. The accompanying accountability questions, the authors say, need to be addressed proactively.]]> Sun, 27 Sep 2009 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The G20 is not just a G7 with extra chairs ]]> http://www.bruegel.org International Cooperation in Times of Global Crisis: Views from G20 Countries conference in Delhi  on 14th and 15th of September, organised by Bruegel, CEPII and ICRIER. The publication draws together the authors‘ conclusions from the Delhi conference and reviews the real role of the G20, while questioning where the non-G7 interests fit into the group‘s agenda. ]]> Mon, 21 Sep 2009 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The Pittsburgh G20 Checklist]]> http://www.bruegel.org Ignazio Angeloni suggests that the Pittsburgh G20 may represent policymakers' last chance at real financial market reform. He develops a shortlist of recommendations for world leaders to tackle at the summit and says that world leaders at the summit must strengthen the stability of the financial sector while avoid micro-management. G20 leaders must also strengthen the global financial governance structures and work on an IMF-led framework to containing the development of future current-account imbalances across nations. This latest version also includes a postscript written by Angeloni and published in the October 2009 issue of Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy judging the outcome of the summit.]]> Fri, 18 Sep 2009 09:46:19 +0100 <![CDATA[Beyond Copenhagen: A climate policymaker's handbook]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    This book looks realistically at the options for a deal to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. It sets out some of the main ingredients that will have to be included for finalisation of an economically rational agreement that stands a real chance of addressing the threat to the climate system. It critically analyses the European Union's climate policies before reviewing the key elements of such an agreement: carbon markets, flexible mechanisms for transferring money and technology to developing countries, innovation, and the effective enforcement of a global climate deal.

    The contributors to the volume are Joseph E Aldy, Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Juan Delgado, Denny Ellerman, Dieter Helm, Axel Michaelowa, Robert N Stavins and Massimo Tavoni. The French Ministère de l‘Ecologie, de l‘Energie, du Développement durable et de la Mer, under the auspices of the 2008 French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, contributed financial support to the production of this volume.]]>
    Thu, 17 Sep 2009 14:57:55 +0100
    <![CDATA[The monetary mechanics of the crisis]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    This is what central banks have done in the current crisis – and rightly so. They have learned the lessons of the Great Depression. This framework helps understand differences across countries. The crisis affected the euro area money and credit supply process much less than the US and the UK. Therefore, the European Central Bank was right to respond to the crisis with a less expansionary monetary policy than the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. However, stabilising the money supply may not have been enough to stabilise the supply of credit.]]>
    Thu, 27 Aug 2009 12:39:31 +0100
    <![CDATA[Memos to the new Commission- Europe's economic priorities 2010-2015]]> http://www.bruegel.org André Sapir and Jean Pisani-Ferry propose that effective leadership will be necessary to give strategic direction to the Commission, "you [the president] should therefore be ready to fight for ideas and take risks" (JPF-AS). The Memos suggest that the EU will need to assert a position on commonly agreed rules, propose new solutions and, importantly, has an opportunity now to redefine the European narrative in the global arena. Focusing on the most important economic questions at EU level, the Bruegel memos are intended to be strategic, outlining the state of affairs that will be met by the new Commission and the key challenges and priorities they will need to consider over the next five years. ]]> Thu, 27 Aug 2009 11:02:02 +0100 <![CDATA[The impact of the crisis on budget policy in Central and Eastern Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Zsolt Darvas concludes with some thoughts on the appropriate policy response from a more normative perspective. The key message of the paper is that the crisis should be used as an opportunity to introduce reforms to avoid future pro-cyclical fiscal policies, to increase the quality of budgeting and to increase credibility. These reforms should include fiscal responsibility laws comprising medium-term fiscal frameworks, fiscal rules, and independent fiscal councils. When fiscal consolidation is accompanied by fiscal reforms that increase credibility, non- Keynesian effects may offset to some extent the contraction caused by the consolidation.]]> Thu, 30 Jul 2009 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[A better process for a better budget]]> http://www.bruegel.org reform.]]> Tue, 28 Jul 2009 17:54:39 +0100 <![CDATA[Lost property: The European patent system and why it doesn't work]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    Mon, 29 Jun 2009 11:09:01 +0100
    <![CDATA[The euro at ten: the next global currency? ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Jean Pisani-Ferry and then-PIEE Deputy Director and current Bruegel board member Adam Posen. The papers and remarks in this volume demonstrate that the euro has proved to be attractive as a fair weather currency for countries and investors well beyond its borders. But it remains to be seen whether it is equipped to also succeed as a stormy weather currency. Contributors: Joaquín Almunia, Maria Celina Arraes, Leszek Balcerowicz, C. Fred Bergsten, Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Kristin J. Forbes, Linda S. Goldberg, C. Randall Henning, Mohsin S. Khan, Antonio de Lecea, Erkki Liikanen, Philippe Martin, Thomas Mayer, André Sapir, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Lawrence H. Summers, and György Szapáry.]]> Sun, 14 Jun 2009 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[A solution for Europe's banking problem]]> http://www.bruegel.org Nicolas Véron and Adam Posen believe Europe should build new long term European joint-action to face the likely high rising number of insolvent banks on the continent. The authors propose on the one hand, a centralised triage and restructuring process of bad European banks lead by a new temporary European Institution, a European Bank Support Authority (EBSA), and on the other hand, long-term EU Institutions dedicated to the completion of an integrated market.]]> Thu, 11 Jun 2009 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[EU Cohesion policy: some fundamental questions]]> http://www.bruegel.org Indhira Santos analyses the impact of the European Union‘s cohesion policy both in terms of economic efficiency and redistribution to needy areas of the EU. She illustrates with data the confusion created by the multiple objectives of current EU cohesion policy and by the political horse-trading over levels of aid granted to different member states and regions. Finally, sh shows how a significant part of EU structural funds involves – ine net economic terms – simply transferring funds between individuals within one and the same region.]]> Sun, 31 May 2009 15:37:27 +0100 <![CDATA[Reframing the EU budget- decision-making process]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sun, 31 May 2009 15:20:44 +0100 <![CDATA[Cyclical dimensions of labour mobility after EU Enlargement]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    Sun, 31 May 2009 15:12:10 +0100
    <![CDATA[A US strategy for IFRS adoption]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 22 Apr 2009 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Handle with care! Post-crisis growth in the EU]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 15 Apr 2009 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 15 Apr 2009 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Politique budgétaire: Stabilisateurs ou politique discrétionnaire?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fin de monde ou sortie de crise, edited by Pierre Dockès and Jean-Hervé Lorenzi.]]> Thu, 02 Apr 2009 01:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Reshaping the global economy]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 31 Mar 2009 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[International governance- is the G20 the right forum?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 30 Mar 2009 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The G20 in the aftermath of the crisis: a Euro-Asian view]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 24 Mar 2009 00:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Weathering the storm- Fair weather versus stormy-weather governance in the euro area]]> http://www.bruegel.org

    Wed, 18 Mar 2009 23:00:00 +0000
    <![CDATA[A lifeline for Europe's young radical innovators]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 16 Mar 2009 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The battle for talent: globalisation and the rise of executive pay]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 09 Feb 2009 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Of markets, products and prices- the effects of the euro on European firms]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 09 Feb 2009 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Beyond the WTO? An anatomy of EU and US preferential trade agreements]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 09 Feb 2009 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Rating agencies: an information privilege whose time has passed]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 04 Feb 2009 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Politics and trade: lessons from past globalisations]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sat, 31 Jan 2009 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Economic incongruities in the European patent system]]> http://www.bruegel.org Bruno van Pottelsberghe argues that the consequences of the fragmentation of the European patent system are more dramatic than the mere prohibitive costs of maintaining a patent in force in many jurisdictions. The authors first show that heterogeneous national litigation costs, practices and outcome induce a high level of uncertainty. But also that a high degree of managerial complexity results from systemic incongruities due to easier parallel imports, possible time paradoxes and the de facto paradox of having EU-level competition policy and granting authority, ultimately facing national jurisdictional primacy on patent issues.]]> Tue, 13 Jan 2009 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Avoiding a new European divide]]> http://www.bruegel.org Zsolt Darvas and Jean Pisani-Ferry show that some of the non euro-area new member states suffer from serious vulnerabilities, to which policy has been slow to respond. They believe that the crisis management in the euro area has had the unintended consequence of putting non euro-area new member states at disadvantage. These are unhealthy developments and without decisive action, a new political and economic divide within Europe may emerge.]]> Sun, 21 Dec 2008 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The International agenda: immediate priorities and longer-term challenges]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 04 Dec 2008 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[A European recovery programme ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 25 Nov 2008 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Safe and Sound: an EU approach to Sovereign Investment]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 06 Nov 2008 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Will the current crisis trigger a revival of the IMF? ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 31 Oct 2008 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Testing times for global financial governance]]> http://www.bruegel.org Ignazio Angeloni believes that the increase in financial interdependence in recent decades has not been matched by sufficient progress in the international coordination among regulatory authorities. In fact, the international financial system has suffered from insufficient globalisation of regulatory and supervisory policies, not excessive globalisation of financial markets.]]> Sun, 19 Oct 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Asia-Europe: The Third Link]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sun, 12 Oct 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Divisions of labour: rethinking Europe's migration policy ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Jakob von Weizsäcker identifies three priority areas for EU policy action and concrete policy suggestions which could fit with the immigration agenda of the French presidency. ]]> Wed, 08 Oct 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The London Agreement and the cost of patenting in Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Bruno van Pottelsberghe analyses the potential consequences of the recently ratified London Agreement, which reduces the patent translation requirements in 15 out of 34 EPC Member States. The simulations suggest that the cumulated costs of patenting have been reduced by 20 to 30 percent thanks to the coming into force of the London Agreement, in May 2008. In nominal terms, the total saving for the business sector is about €220 million. As well as these substantial cost savings, the authors expect an increase in the demand for patents of eight to 12 percent.]]> Wed, 01 Oct 2008 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Portrait of the Union as a player on the world stage]]> http://www.bruegel.org Confrontations Europe book "Looking for the European interest", a collective work directed by Philippe Herzog. ]]> Wed, 24 Sep 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The new corporation in Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Dalia Marin argues that firms are adapting to heightening global competition by shifting decision-making processes. The author gives policy recommendations in the areas of EU neighbourhood and trade policies.]]> Tue, 02 Sep 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The new food equation: do EU policies add up?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sat, 19 Jul 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Europe's R&D: Missing the Wrong Targets?]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    Published in Intereconomics, July 2008. ]]>
    Tue, 15 Jul 2008 23:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[Empower users of financial information as the IASC Foundation‘s stakeholders]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 10 Jul 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The demographics of global corporate champions]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 30 Jun 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Higher aspirations: an agenda for reforming European universities]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 03 Jun 2008 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[A tail of two countries]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sun, 01 Jun 2008 00:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Policy-makers and the R&D-patent relationship ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Bruno van Pottelsberghe and Gaétan De Rassenfosseargue that the number of priority filings should be used as a patent-based measure of Europe‘s innovation performance.  The paper identifies several policies that may affect the R&D-patent relationship.]]> Thu, 29 May 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Fair value accounting is the wrong scapegoat for this crisis ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 29 May 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Politique économique : avons-nous appris ?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sat, 10 May 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Public pensions and intra-EU mobility: an unfinished agenda]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 30 Apr 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Two Learning Curves on Sovereign Wealth Funds]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 30 Apr 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Progressive governance and globalisation]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 29 Apr 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Reducing the climate change bill]]> http://www.bruegel.org the Think Global Act European project Juan Delgado argues that early, effective and cost-efficient policies are crucial to achieving the objective of keeping future temperature changes below two degrees celsius. He calls for a concentration of efforts in two areas: a functioning carbon market and a broad post-Kyoto international agreement.]]> Sun, 27 Apr 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Government size and output volatility: should we forsake automatic stabilisation?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 31 Mar 2008 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Is structural spending on solid foundations?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 19 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Europe's R&D: missing the wrong targets?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sat, 02 Feb 2008 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Early Lessons of the Financial Crisis]]> http://www.bruegel.org Europe's World, a Brussels-based quarterly, I try to draw tentative lessons from the first few months of the still unfolding financial crisis.]]> Thu, 31 Jan 2008 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Financing Europe's fast movers]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sat, 19 Jan 2008 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Coming of age: report on the euro area ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 14 Jan 2008 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The end of Europe's longstanding indifference to the renminbi]]> http://www.bruegel.org Jean Pisani-Ferry observes the lack of European interest towards China‘s exchange policy rate. He believes that Europeans, compared to Americans, are slower to react to external developments. The absence of significant external deficit, doubts about which policy stance is desirable, internal disagreements, an untested governance of exchange-rate relations, and a habit of following US leadership may have all contributed to a slow European response. That said, the Europeans have recently woken up to the issue as the euro has appreciated quickly against both the dollar and the renminbi, and they can be expected to adopt an increasingly active stance on China‘s exchange rate policy.]]> Mon, 14 Jan 2008 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Why Europe is not carbon competitive]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 19 Nov 2007 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The happy few: the internationalisation of European firms]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sun, 11 Nov 2007 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[EU adoption of the IFRS 8 standard on operating segments ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Nicolas Véron discusses whether the EU should adopt the controversial IFRS 8 standard, a convergence project on how companies should report the performance of their individual business segments. Véron‘s recommendation is for the European Union not to adopt the current version of IFRS 8.]]> Sat, 29 Sep 2007 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Why Reform Europe's Universities?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 31 Aug 2007 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Fragmented power: Europe and the global economy]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    To date there has been no comprehensive study of European international economic relations. This book fills that gap. It examines the main areas of Europe‘s foreign economic policy: trade, development, external competition policy, external financial markets, external monetary policy, migration and external energy/environment policy.

    This book explains why it is time for the EU to wake up to its global responsibilities, and why, in the absence of reform of its governance system, Europe risks remaining a fragmented power.
    The contributors to the volume are Alan Ahearne, Marco Becht, Olivier Bertrand, Arne Bigsten, Herbert Brücker, Beno?Æt Coeuré, Luis Correia Da Silva, Barry Eichengreen, Simon J. Evenett, Marc Ivaldi, Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir, Coby van der Linde and Jakob von Weizsäcker.
    The book is sold out. You may download it from this page.]]>
    Fri, 31 Aug 2007 23:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[EU climate policy: dividing up the commons ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 29 Aug 2007 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Le fonds Européen d'ajustement à la mondialisation: pour quoi faire?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Published in La revue de l'OFCE, no 102]]> Fri, 17 Aug 2007 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Is Europe ready for a major banking crisis? ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 09 Aug 2007 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[10 lessons about budget consolidation ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Jens Henriksson seeks to pinpoint, and to convey to fellow policymakers, what equations and econometrics do not capture. His ten lessons provide essential reading for the many countries where budget sustainability still remains an issue.]]> Sun, 29 Jul 2007 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Transparency would help to address the audit market problem ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sun, 29 Jul 2007 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[What should a cautious immigration policy look like?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 30 Apr 2007 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Irregular and high-skilled migration not such strange bedfellows]]> http://www.bruegel.org Think Global Act European project, Jakob von Weizsäcker dicusses which aspects of migration policy should be coordinated or harmonised and which should remain a national prerogative. He argues that European migration policy during the incoming French, Czech and Swedish trio of EU Presidencies requires a dual focus: on irregular migration and on high-skilled migration.

    Fri, 27 Apr 2007 23:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[The global accounting experiment ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 11 Apr 2007 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Real Convergence, Price Level Convergence and Inflation in Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sat, 31 Mar 2007 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Energy: choices for Europe ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Follow the link below to see the complete dataset (data sources and methodology) of the Energy Policy Index (EPI)
    Thu, 22 Mar 2007 23:00:00 +0000
    <![CDATA[Global imbalances: time for action]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 28 Feb 2007 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Family capitalism and the French problem with work]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sun, 18 Feb 2007 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The economics of the Services Directive]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    Sat, 03 Feb 2007 23:00:00 +0000
    <![CDATA[Current issues in evaluating structual reforms within the Lisbon process ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 31 Jan 2007 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[A better Globalisation Fund]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 31 Jan 2007 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Tying hands is not commitment: can fiscal rules and institutions really enhance fiscal discipline?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sun, 31 Dec 2006 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Global governance: an agenda for Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 30 Nov 2006 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Financial integration and European priorities]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    Jean Pisani-Ferry discusses the fact that Europe's financial integration is significantly more advanced than the integration of products and labour markets. He advocates a more strategic approach to financial sector reforms and an explicit identification of the way in which they can help to alleviate the main constraints on growth or contribute to improving the stability of the euro area.]]>
    Tue, 31 Oct 2006 23:00:00 +0000
    <![CDATA[Economic reforms in the euro area: is there a common agenda?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sun, 29 Oct 2006 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[A primer on innovation and growth]]> http://www.bruegel.org Philippe Aghion emphasises that for Europe to stimulate innovation and growth, it is not enough to increase spending on research and development and the protection of intellectual property. ]]> Mon, 09 Oct 2006 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Single market trails home bias]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sat, 30 Sep 2006 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The EU and the governance of globalisation]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 31 Aug 2006 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[European perspectives on global imbalances]]> http://www.bruegel.org Asia Europe Economic Forum conference.]]> Thu, 31 Aug 2006 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Choice in the UK audit market ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 29 Aug 2006 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Some ideas for reforming the community anti-dumping instrument ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 10 Jul 2006 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[A European Blue Card Proposal]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 30 Jun 2006 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Will global capitalism fall again?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 29 Jun 2006 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Farewell national champions]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 31 May 2006 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[There is room for improvement in the appointment of ECB executive board members ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 29 May 2006 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA["Generation Enkellos" und Rentenbeitragsrabatt für Eltern]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sun, 30 Apr 2006 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Welcome to Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Fri, 31 Mar 2006 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[The European Services Directive]]> http://www.bruegel.org
    Fri, 31 Mar 2006 23:00:00 +0100
    <![CDATA[Last exit to Lisbon ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Mon, 13 Mar 2006 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The Last exit to lisbon]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 28 Feb 2006 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Mediocre growth in the Euro area: is governance part of the answer ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Jean Pisani-Ferry's note was prepared for the European Parliament-National Parliaments Debate on "How to Raise Growth in the Euro Area?" in Brussels.]]> Mon, 20 Feb 2006 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[The Euro: only for the agile]]> http://www.bruegel.org Tue, 31 Jan 2006 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Global current account imbalances: how to manage the risk for Europe]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 01 Dec 2005 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Fiscal policy in EMU: towards a sustainability and growth pact ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Wed, 30 Nov 2005 23:00:00 +0000 <![CDATA[Globalisation and the reform of European social models ]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 08 Sep 2005 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[Can Multilateralism Survive the Rise of the BRICs?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Sat, 02 Jul 2005 23:00:00 +0100 <![CDATA[What's wrong with the Lisbon Agenda?]]> http://www.bruegel.org Thu, 02 Jun 2005 23:00:00 +0100